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Today, Information Operations (IO) is an area of emerging importance in military 
science.  IO however is not new.  Many of the elements of IO have existed for hundreds, 
and in the case of specific elements like military deception (MILDEC), for thousands of 
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I. INTRODUCTION TO INFORMATION OPERATIONS (IO) 
A. WHY IO? 
American military operations after World War II featured several large 
conventional operations like Korea, Desert Storm, and Iraqi Freedom.  However, there 
was Vietnam, as well as limited American involvement in the Philippines and Greece to 
help counter those three insurgencies.  Martin Van Creveld, in his book The 
Transformation of War, argues that the frequency of insurgencies continues to increase.  
The attraction of insurgency is simple; it works against superior forces, as in Vietnam 
over forty years ago or Iraq today.  Unlike the American experience in Vietnam, 
however, Britain has had success in counter insurgency operations.  In that regard, British 
operations in Malaya from 1948-1960, showed that IO was a crucial to countering an 
insurgency.  Therefore, this paper will use the Malayan case to determine if American IO 
doctrine, in support of counter insurgency operations, has the necessary elements to 
succeed.   
 
B. ELEMENTS OF INFORMATION OPERATIONS IN THE PAST 
Information Operations (IO) are defined “in the Department of Defense (DOD) 
IO policy as the ‘integrated employment of the core capabilities of electronic warfare 
(EW), computer network operations (CNO), psychological operations (PSYOP), military 
deception (MILDEC), and operations security (OPSEC) in concert with specified 
supporting and related capabilities to influence, disrupt, corrupt or usurp adversarial 
human and automated decision making while protecting our own’”1.  While some of the 
current literature could lead a reader to believe that IO is a recent development, certain 
pillars such as MILDEC, PYSOP and OPSEC have existed for thousands of years. Past 
experts in IO include Sun Tzu, who wrote about these three elements in his classic work 
on military strategy, and the Carthaginian general Hannibal, who also employed elements 
of IO to win the battle of Cannae. In this specific battle, Hannibal applied MILDEC 
through his use of the crescent formation combined with a slowly retreating center, which 
                                                 
1 "Joint Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for Information Operations (JP 3-13),"  (Department of 
Defense, 9 Oct 1998), I-1. 
2 
convinced the Roman Consuls that the Carthaginian center was collapsing.  At the same 
time, the use of OPSEC hid Hannibal’s true intent as the battle developed, until it was 
time to execute the final movement, resulting in the Carthaginians lopsided victory.  
History is full of examples of the effective use of IO.  However, the most 
significant recent event in the development of IO occurred in the 20th Century.  
America’s involvement in World War II began with the Japanese surprise attack on Pearl 
Harbor on Dec 7, 1941.  “The operation began with Vice Admiral Nagumo Chuichi and 
his task force of 6 aircraft carriers, 2 battleships, 3 cruisers and 11 destroyers leaving 
Tokyo Harbor on November 23, 1941.”2  Sixteen days later, after crossing the Pacific 
Ocean, Japan attacked Pearl Harbor.  This operation was a classic use of OPSEC in 
denying the adversary information to achieve surprise. 
Another significant IO operation occurred during World War II.  Codenamed 
Operation Bodyguard, its purpose was to provide the allies with an extra edge that could 
mean the difference between failure and success of the Normandy Invasion.3  Winston 
Churchill proclaimed, “If we pull this off, it will be the greatest hoax in history.”4  The 
design of Operation Bodyguard incorporated the dissemination of tens of thousands of 
splinters of information, “that when reassembled by the Third Reich would create a 
highly plausible, but false picture of allied intentions.”5  There were five primary 
elements of Operation Bodyguard.  
 a. Deception (MILDEC) 
 b. Security (OPSEC) and counterintelligence 
 c. Offensive Intelligence 
 d. Political Warfare (a combination of Public Affairs and PSYOPS) 
 e. Brutal unadulterated mayhem. 
                                                 
2 Encyclopedia Britannica Vol 9, p. 227 
3 William B. Breuer, Hoodwinking Hitler: The Normandy Deception (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1993), 
13. 
4 Breuer, Hoodwinking Hitler: The Normandy Deception, 13. 
5 Breuer, Hoodwinking Hitler: The Normandy Deception, 13. 
3 
The primary emphasis of Operation Bodyguard was to deceive German decision 
makers as to the intended exact invasion location.  As the date for the invasion 
approached, the deception plan expanded to include new and emerging technologies like 
radar. The radar countermeasures developed for D-Day and other mission areas became 
the basis of what we now call Electronic Warfare (EW).  In many respects the newer 
elements of IO, such as EW, were born during WWII. The buildup prior to Normandy 
used thousands of people, radio signals, newspaper stories, celebrities, actors, and the 
Germans themselves to build the illusion that the invasion was going to take place 
somewhere other than Normandy.   
Hiding the movement of the invasion fleet toward the beaches required new 
capabilities that today form the basis of modern EW.  Prior to Normandy, the primary 
uses of EW, by both sides, were limited to confusing bombers (via mismatched direction 
finders), radars, and communications denial.  In 1942, Joan Curran developed two new 
capabilities to fool German radars, codenamed Window and Moonshine.6  Moonshine was 
a powerful jammer that took the German Wurzberg radar pulse, amplified it and sent the 
modified pulse back to the Wurzberg radar.  This resulted in a large return similar in size 
to what an invasion fleet would look like.  The second major development, Window, is 
the modern equivalent of the chaff dispensed by onboard protective systems of modern 
ships and planes.7  To confuse German radar operators, RAF formations mixed bombers 
carrying Mandrel noise jammers with the aircraft-dispensing Window.  Aircraft orbit 
patterns created small gaps in the jamming, allowing German radar operators to see 
through the electronic noise.  In this gap, the operators could see a false fleet created by 
the Window and Moonshine transmitters.  A later development called Filbert enhanced 
the illusion of an impending invasion fleet.  Filbert was a small launch towed by a real 
ship which broadcast the prerecorded sounds of a landing force debarking, using tapes 
made during the allied invasion of Salerno, Italy in 1943.8  During the actual invasion, 
the allies positioned the false fleet off the coast of Calais.  This movement was in 
                                                 
6 Breuer, Hoodwinking Hitler: The Normandy Deception, 176. 
7 Jane's Radar and Electronic Warfare Systems, ed. M. Streetly (London: Biddles Ltd., 2002), 464. 
8 Breuer, Hoodwinking Hitler: The Normandy Deception, 177. 
4 
conjunction with the deliberate dropping of rubber dummies in the Calais area reinforcing 
the notion of an allied invasion in progress at Calais.9  
Operation Bodyguard targeted Adolph Hitler as the key German decision maker.  
The result of the Bodyguard deception leading up to D-day was the deliberate German 
positioning of their mobile reserves to attack “allied beachheads” at Calais, just as the 
allies intended.  Furthermore, it caused Hitler to deny permission for those mobile forces 
to move to Normandy, even as the German commander, Field Marshall Rommel, 
demanded they be committed against the allied beachhead there.  Hitler continued to 
believe that Normandy was a feint by the allies and the real invasion would come at 
Calais.  The allies established a secure beachhead by the time German High Command 
realized Normandy was not a feint.  Integrated and synchronized IO capabilities created 
strategic paralysis in the German High Command, keeping Germany’s mobile forces 
away from Normandy.  The integration, coordination, and cooperation among the various 
IO capabilities were crucial to the success of Operation Bodyguard.  
 
C. TODAY’S INFORMATION OPERATIONS  
Similarly, the British efforts in Malaya in 1948-1960, showed the importance of 
Information Operations in successfully countering an insurgent threat.  As stated by Lt 
Gen Briggs, Malaya was primarily a political conflict in which the war of ideas was the 
critical fulcrum by which the population would choose one side or the other.10   
Today, the American Department of Defense’s (DOD’s) official viewpoint on IO 
is in the latest draft of JP 3-13, dated 2005.  Prepared under the direction of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff (JCS), JP 3-13, combined with supporting doctrine for specific 
capabilities like MILDEC, OPSEC, PSYOP, CNO, and EW, provides the ultimate 
guidance for IO.  Specifically the purpose of JP 3-13;  
. . . sets forth the doctrine to govern the joint activities and performance of 
the Armed Forces of the United States in joint operations and provides the 
doctrinal basis for United States military involvement in multinational and 
interagency operations.  It provides military guidance for the exercise of 
                                                 
9 Breuer, Hoodwinking Hitler: The Normandy Deception, 178. 
10 Anthony Short, The Communist Insurrection in Malaya, 1948-1960 (New York: Crane, Russak, 
1975), 115. 
5 
authority by combatant commanders and other joint operations and 
training.  It provides military guidance for the exercise of authority by 
combatant commanders and other joint force commanders (JFCs) and 
prescribes doctrine for other joint operations and training.  It provides 
military guidance for use by the Armed Forces in preparing their 
appropriate plans.  It is not the intent of this publication {JP 3-13} to 
restrict the authority of the JFC from organizing the force to ensure unity 
of effort in the accomplishment of the overall mission.11 
Like Operation Bodyguard, the “ultimate strategic objective of IO is to affect the 
adversary or potential decision makers to the degree that will cause them to modify 
personal actions, or direct their subordinates to modify or cease actions, that threaten the 
United States national security interests”.12  As recognized by DOD planners, IO has 
physical and informational properties, in addition to the human properties highlighted in 
Operation Bodyguard.  The information dimension is ever changing, increasingly 
complex, and omnipresent which complicates planning further.  JP 3-13 also recognizes 
that movements within the information domain are more complex than the physical 
dimension.   
One of the major developments from the past is the concept of information 
superiority, which is defined in JP 3-13 as the “capability to collect, process and 
disseminate an uninterrupted flow of information while exploiting or denying an 
adversary’s’ capability to do the same.”13  In addition to the functions of CNO, EW, 
MILDEC, PSYOP and OPSEC, JP 3-13 defines several supporting and related 
capabilities.  The additional areas are Information Assurance (IA), Physical Security, 
Physical Attack, Counterintelligence, Public Affairs (PA), Civil Military Operations 
(CMO), Public Diplomacy (PD) and Information Management...14 
For the purpose of this paper, the major British IO lessons from the Malayan 
Emergency will become the lens through with which the author examines American joint 
doctrine.  This lens will provide insight into how the American military prioritizes IO 
resources and training.    Unfortunately, the time and environment of the Malayan 
                                                 
11 "Joint Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for Information Operations (JP 3-13)," i. 
12 "Joint Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for Information Operations (JP 3-13)," I-12. 
13 "Joint Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for Information Operations (JP 3-13)," i. 
14 "Joint Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for Information Operations (JP 3-13)," I-9. 
6 
Emergency will limit the IO areas covered in this thesis.  Those IO areas not covered are 
Physical Attack, Physical Security, Counter-Intelligence, Information Assurance, and 
Computer Network operations.  Some areas like Physical Attack, Physical Security, and 
Counterintelligence are timeless, but outside the scope of this thesis.  Finally, modern 
information systems were not available during the Malayan Emergency.  Information 
Assurance, which applies to the quality, reliability, and availability of modern 
information systems, is not relevant for this reason.  Computer Network Operations will 
not be considered, as there were no modern information systems in use by either side 
during the Malayan Emergency.   
The first chapter serves as an introduction to Information Operations past and 
present.  The second chapter will utilize the framework developed by R.W. Komer for 
analyzing the IO dimensions of the Malayan Emergency (ME).  Komer’s framework 
divides the ME into five time phases, with the first phase being the insurgent build up 
ending in 1948.   The second phase covers the initial British steps and missteps (1948-
1950) and the third is based upon the Briggs plan of 1950-1952.   The two final phases 
are from 1952-1954, when the British successfully turned the tide, and then from 1954-
1960 when they finished dealing with the last elements of the insurgency.15   Each phase 
will be examined in terms of the application of individual elements of IO, defined as 
Military Deception (MILDEC), Psychological Operations (PSYOPs), Operational 
Security (OPSEC) and Electronic Warfare (EW).  This thesis will also assess the 
effectiveness of the related capabilities of PA, CMO, and PD, for each of the five phases 
in Komer’s framework and identify certain key lessons.  These lessons become the basis 
of the evaluation of American doctrine in the next chapter. 
The third chapter will analyze current U.S. joint doctrine through the lens of 
lessons learned from British Malaya.  In this chapter, an examination of current US 
doctrine through the Malayan lenses will determine what similarities, differences, and 
shortfalls exist.  Chapter 4 will conclude with recommendations based upon the analysis 
of the differences. 
                                                 
15R. W. Komer and United States. Advanced Research Projects Agency., The Malayan Emergency in 
Retrospect; Organization of a Successful Counterinsurgency Effort (Santa Monica, CA.: Rand, 1972).  
7 
Finally, there are two limitations to this thesis.  The limitation is the use of a 
single case on which to base the analysis.   To draw broad implications about IO from a 
single case can be problematic, particularly as this thesis examines Information 
Operations, counter-insurgency, and Joint Publications.  The second limitation is one of 
scope.  To cover the gamut of Information Operations, counter-insurgency, and Joint 
Publications would take this thesis far beyond its scope. Thus, examination of context 
will be limited to those documents that in the opinion of the author most directly bear on 
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II. THE MALAYAN EMERGENCY 
A. WHY MALAYA 
 It may be argued that the origins of the insurrection in Malaya should be 
sought in the economic and social conditions of the time, in political 
disturbances, in the repressive acts of government and in the experiences 
of the Malay and the Chinese communities during and after the war.  
These arguments have their place; and while it cannot be denied that 
upheavals of some kind would have occurred in its absence, the presence 
of the Malayan Communist Party—its membership, its experience, and its 
objectives—ensured that when it began, formally in June 1948, it took on 
the shape of a Communist insurrection; it is to this party and its 
organization that we turn first.16   
Malaya is an example of a resource-limited (money, manpower, equipment) 
government that defeats a well-equipped, experienced, and organized insurgent force.  In 
the case of Malaya, the United Kingdom (U.K.) and its successor, the Government of 
Malaya (GOM), successfully countered a large-scale insurgency and achieved 
independence, “all while spending less than 800 million dollars” during the 12 years of 
the emergency.17  Malaya offers much in showing how a multifaceted civil, military and 
information program provides an optimum counterinsurgency response.18  These 
combined programs did not happen overnight, but rather, were an evolution of the U.K. 
and GOM learning and adapting to the situation based upon their successes and failures.  
Through trial and error, the counter-insurgency efforts of the U.K. (later GOM) evolved 
from an initial campaign based on retribution into one that focused on breaking the 
relationship between the insurgents and the population base.19   
To achieve this “hearts and minds approach” to counterinsurgency, Britain 
employed a campaign that blended control, information, political, economic, and social 
measures.  The counter insurgency (C-I) was managed on a daily basis by a unified civil-
                                                 
16 Short, The Communist Insurrection in Malaya, 1948-1960, 1. 
17 Komer and United States. Advanced Research Projects Agency., The Malayan Emergency in 
Retrospect; Organization of a Successful Counterinsurgency Effort, vii. 
18 Komer and United States. Advanced Research Projects Agency., The Malayan Emergency in 
Retrospect; Organization of a Successful Counterinsurgency Effort, 1. 
19 Anthony Derry, Emergency in Malaya: The Psychological Dimension (Latimer, UK: Psychological 
Operations Section, Joint Warfare Wing, National Defence College, 1982), 4-1. 
10 
military command structure.20  At the upper most level, the British employed their 
“Committee” system, with war executive committees extending from the top down to the 
district level.  While headed by civilians, military officers in dual roles occupied many 
key positions.  Effective administration using local civil and police forces were crucial in 
minimizing the cost of the Emergency.  Malaya’s own tin and rubber export revenues 
paid the eventual 800 million dollar cost of the Emergency. 21  The ability to succeed at a 
low cost, using an information campaign and civil measures to achieve popular support is 
the reason for choosing the Malayan Emergency. 
 
B. THE INSURGENT BUILDUP  
The insurgency in Malaya did not occur overnight, in fact, it had been festering 
since April of 1930.  The Malayan Communist Party (MCP), based upon the remains of 
the former South Seas Communist Party, was in existence less than 3 years before the 
British Authority arrested its two primary leaders and many of the organization.22  The 
MCP was also composed primarily of ethnic Chinese.23  Several years passed and the 
MCP adopted a different organizational tact before it rose to prominence again.  In 1937, 
the Malayan General Labor Union (MGLU), a front organization for the MCP, led a 
successful strike at the Batu Arang Coal mine.  During the strike, the MCP, under the 
guise of the MGLU, attempted to establish a Soviet-style government of workers.  The 
British Authority quickly put down the MGLU government.24  However, a resurgent 
Germany in Europe and militant Japan in the East tempered the British response.  
The MCP realized that Germany and Japan changed the world political situation; 
yet, they did not see this as a sufficient inducement to cooperate with British 
                                                 
20 Komer and United States. Advanced Research Projects Agency., The Malayan Emergency in 
Retrospect; Organization of a Successful Counterinsurgency Effort, VI. 
21 Komer and United States. Advanced Research Projects Agency., The Malayan Emergency in 
Retrospect; Organization of a Successful Counterinsurgency Effort, VII. 
22 Komer and United States. Advanced Research Projects Agency., The Malayan Emergency in 
Retrospect; Organization of a Successful Counterinsurgency Effort, 1. 
23 Komer and United States. Advanced Research Projects Agency., The Malayan Emergency in 
Retrospect; Organization of a Successful Counterinsurgency Effort, 2. 
24 Komer and United States. Advanced Research Projects Agency., The Malayan Emergency in 
Retrospect; Organization of a Successful Counterinsurgency Effort, 1. 
11 
administrators.25   The MCP position did not change until 1940, when the MCP publicly 
supported British policies.26  In return, the British governor legalized and legitimized 
MCP status.  To prove good faith, the British governor also released multiple MCP 
political prisoners that had been in prison in an effort to help shore up the MCP for the 
anticipated fight with the Japanese.27   However, internal memos and post-insurgency 
interviews indicate that the MCP leadership actually saw the coming conflict as an 
opportunity to improve their position.28  These documents and interviews reaffirmed that 
the MCP’s primary objective was expulsion of the British from Malaya.  In 1941, the 
Japanese invaded Malaya, further transforming the MCP’s prospects.  Shortly after this, 
the MCP renamed itself the Malayan Peoples Anti Japanese Army (MPAJA). 
The first wartime policy of the MPAJA was to issue a basic policy ensuring civil 
liberties and vernacular education.  The basic policy ended with a call for all native 
Malays (all ethnicities) to join with the Soviet Union and China in their struggle.  
Nowhere in this policy was the restoration of British sovereignty mentioned.29  
Simultaneously, the MPAJA was lobbying the British for support in their fight against the 
Japanese.  British support did not begin until the arrival of the Liberator bombers in 1944, 
which greatly increased Britain’s capability to transport supplies to the Malayan 
resistance fighters.30 By the end of the war, British supply drops inserted over 500 
personnel and 1.5 million pounds of equipment.31  Though allies, the British were still 
distrustful of the MPAJA/MCP, and limited the number of machine-guns and radios that 
were delivered.  In mid-1945, the war ended with the Japanese surrendering in place.  
                                                 
25 Komer and United States. Advanced Research Projects Agency., The Malayan Emergency in 
Retrospect; Organization of a Successful Counterinsurgency Effort, 1. 
26 Komer and United States. Advanced Research Projects Agency., The Malayan Emergency in 
Retrospect; Organization of a Successful Counterinsurgency Effort, 2. 
27 Komer and United States. Advanced Research Projects Agency., The Malayan Emergency in 
Retrospect; Organization of a Successful Counterinsurgency Effort, 2. 
28 Short, The Communist Insurrection in Malaya, 1948-1960, 26. 
29 Komer and United States. Advanced Research Projects Agency., The Malayan Emergency in 
Retrospect; Organization of a Successful Counterinsurgency Effort, 3. 
30 L. Thompson, Dirty Wars: A History of Guerilla Warfare (Somerset, Great Britain: David & 
Charles Military Books, 1990), 84. 
31 Komer and United States. Advanced Research Projects Agency., The Malayan Emergency in 
Retrospect; Organization of a Successful Counterinsurgency Effort, 3. 
12 
When the British returned, they found Malaya in “somewhat of a shambles”, with the 
MPAJA in de facto control of many areas of Malaya.32 
Instead of attacking the MPAJA, the British impressed them into service, placing 
them under military command and putting the MPAJA on the British payroll.33  As the 
British solidified their position, they opened negotiations with the MPAJA.  The initial 
British objective was the return of as many weapons as possible from the supply drops 
during World War II.  The negotiations resulted in the newly renamed Malayan 
Communist Party (formerly the Malayan Peoples Anti Japanese Army) receiving legal 
status and recognition for the party’s wartime role.34 The British were somewhat shocked 
to have more weapons turned in than they dropped (in some areas), and yet to also 
witness the large number of automatic weapons and semi automatic pistols that were not 
returned.  Explosives, detonators, and automatic weapons were not returned, in spite of 
the tons of munitions delivered in the closing days of the war.35  With the conclusion of 
negotiations and the MCP well armed, the stage was set for the coming insurgency.  The 
MCP continuing to follow their original policy drafted in 1943 and moved towards active 
intimidation of the populace.  Between Oct 1945 and Dec 1947, the MCP murdered and 
abducted 191 people in its play for power36. 
 
C. OPEN INSURGENCY AND THE INITIAL BRITISH STEPS (1948-1950) 
1. Overview of Events between 1948 and 1950 
The campaign of intimidation reached a crescendo in 1948 with 109 murders 
committed in the first 6 months of 1948.37  While no one can pinpoint the exact date that 
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the insurgency began, all will agree on the single event which captured the British 
administrations attention.  On June 16, 1948, the MCP ambushed and killed three 
prominent planters.38  Previously on May 21, these same planters had been involved in 
discussions with the British High Commissioner, Sir Edward Gent, as to the state of the 
current Malayan affairs.  The planters had asked that Gent declare Malaya to be in a state 
of emergency.39   With the three planters’ deaths, the Malayan administration declared a 
state of emergency on June 19.  Initial British estimates indicated that the emergency 
would only last six weeks.40  However, Britain was not in a position to fight a long war at 
a remote outpost, since she was trying to recover financially from WWII, which had 
bankrupted the British Economy.41  The climate in Malaya in June of 1948 favored an 
insurgency: the government and the economy had not recovered from the Japanese 
occupation.  At the same time the administrative structure and security forces were weak 
and under strength, while crime and banditry were rife.42  
The MCP, in conjunction with the attack on the three planters, began the 
insurgency by publishing their initial objectives.  Exact objectives are below: 
a. Increase the rice ration and reduce its official price [Malaya required imports of 
rice to supplement internal production, which left many Chinese families on the 
edge of survival] 
b. Oppose removal of families [unassimilated Chinese referred to as squatters] 
c. Freedom for tilling of the land [untended land illegally occupied by Chinese 
squatters] 
d. Abolish high taxation 
e. Less rent and less interest43 
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As the insurgency, progressed, initial MCP estimates of a supportive popular 
uprising did not occur and they eventually retreated to the jungle at the end of 1949.  
While, the Chinese represented a significant portion (thirty-eight percent) of the 
population, they were not a majority.44  Consequently, during their retreat to the jungle, 
the MCP eventually shifted their strategy to a classic Maoist campaign. 
Initial British evaluations of what they faced were both accurate and wrong.  The 
British correctly assessed that the key industrial targets were the tin mines and rubber 
plantations of Malaya.45  At the same time, they correctly identified the unassimilated 
Chinese civilian population as the base from which the insurgents hoped to draw 
support.46  They realized that, in addition to recruits, the critical link would be the food 
and supplies that friendly Chinese (referred to as Min Yuen) would supply to the 
insurgents.47 Initial estimates of the size of the insurgent force ranged from Britain’s 
estimate of 2,000 up to the estimate of 10,000 supplied by the former Soviet Union, both 
of which were wrong.48  Post insurgency interviews and records found the actual number 
to be in excess of 12,000.49  This was coupled with an initial British effort that was 
characterized by the future British Commander, Lt Gen Briggs, as “inadequate, 
undermanned and under managed,” partly due to a lack of trained Chinese linguists.50  
The British government replaced the High Commissioner, police chief, attorney general, 
and the Financial Secretary for their inept handling of the initial emergency.  The military 
commander escaped removal only by having assumed command on July 1, one day prior 
to the British Government’s decision to replace the civilian administration.51  The 
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Malayan people’s faith in the government was not helped by the decision to completely 
change the civil and military administration of Malaya.  MCP propaganda portrayed the 
change in administration as an indication of the success of the insurgency, and began 
generating questions amongst the local populace about the administration’s chances of 
winning.  This loss of faith in the British Administration hampered early calls to the 
Chinese Community for support.  The new High Commissioner, Sir Henry Gurney, 
arrived in August 1948.52  For the next few months, the scale of violence increased while 
the British administration studied the problem.  The most conclusive item resulting from 
the study was the British realization that to win, Malaya had to become independent.  The 
United Kingdom’s Foreign Ministry codified this conclusion on April 13, 1949.53  
2. Electronic Warfare (EW) and Military Deception (MILDEC) 
Hoping to take advantage of technology, initial British attempts to locate and 
gather information on insurgent operations relied heavily upon communications 
intelligence (COMINT).  This capability had really only come to the forefront during 
WWII, roughly five years earlier.  During this conflict, the British had developed 
sophisticated means of communications intelligence (COMINT).  However, enforcement 
of strict import controls on radios prior to the Malayan insurgency limited the MCP’s 
radio capability.54  This action, when coupled with the lack of radios dropped during 
WWII to the MPAJA, resulted in the MCP having to rely on couriers as their primary 
means of communication.55 Because of these two actions, two-way radios were limited to 
MCP elite.  Units at the platoon, and company level did not have radios.  There were 
some receiver type radios available for listening to Radio Peking,56 but this lack of radios 
was to limit the overall value that COMINT would play in the Malayan Emergency. 
The British initially did not use radios in early operations due to their overly 
restrictive weight and bulk.  Instead, they relied on a combination of timed patrols and 
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couriers when combating the insurgents.57  Even when British COMINT was able to 
determine where the party elite were located, the rebel force seemed to melt away as 
British units advanced upon it.  Thus for the majority of the war, EW did not play a 
significant role. 
The only other possible role for EW was the active jamming of Radio Peking.  
Hugh Carlton-Greene, the director of Emergency Information, overturned the decision to 
jam Radio Peking in 1949.  Simply put, Greene reasoned that jamming Radio Peking 
supported MCP propaganda, which claimed that the British Administration was hiding 
something from the Malayan People.58  This same reasoning eventually led to Greene 
forbidding the use of black propaganda at a strategic level.  Military Deception and 
propaganda were also limited, as administrators saw MILDEC and propaganda as 
possibly compromising the theme of an open and honest administration.  The British and 
the MCP were fighting over the Malayan population and Greene reasoned that a strategic 
deception could have serious consequences on British credibility.  Consequently, the 
Malayan Emergency did not see the use of strategic deception.59  
3. Operational Security (OPSEC) 
During this phase, there were no significant improvements in OPSEC.  The 
insurgents had the advantage of knowing when and where the British patrols inserted into 
the jungle.  From that point on, the British had limited success in making contact with the 
insurgents.60  Initially, the British limited military formations to large sweeps, which 
were hard to hide.  By mid 1949, the military had shifted to aggressive small unit patrols 
using random routes.61  The major problem that the British had to contend with in 
OPSEC was that the insurgents seemed to know British plans from the moment British 
forces departed their barracks.  “Intimate friendly relations with the civilian population 
allow guerillas to obtain near perfect intelligence concerning the militaries [sic]” strength 
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and movements,”62 for this reason, the insurgents knew what British movements were.  
Chalmers Johnson, in his book Revolutionary Change, further highlights how the civilian 
population can serve as an intelligence system for the insurgents.  In Malaya, this was 
certainly the case, particularly during the early years.  As Johnson points out, finding a 
new means to conceal British movements became crucial, as circumventing the entire 
Malayan population was not possible. 
4. Psychological Operations (PSYOPs) and Public Affairs (PA) 
The new British High Commissioner, Sir Henry Gurney arrived in August of 
1948.  Gurney increased the emphasis on PSYOPS, just as the PSYWAR division 
became operational in September of 1948.  The original configuration of the PSYWAR 
Department was primarily military, with most of the personnel’s experience gained 
during World War II.  Malaya was a fundamentally different type of confrontation.63 
Relying on past experience, the PSYWAR division approached the Malayan 
Emergency from a rather traditional perspective, and guidance from the High 
Commissioner further diluted the effectiveness of PSYWAR.  Responding to criticism 
from the commercial planters, following the killing of three planters by the insurgents, 
the primary PSYOPs theme became revenge.64  This resulted in a PSYOPS campaign, 
which threatened not only the insurgents but also the local populace who helped them, 
even if such help was against the locals’ will.65  The British discussed seven but settled 
on two means of disseminating messages.  The two means were leaflets and the 
vernacular press (See fig 1) for reaching the population and the insurgents.66  
During this period, the new newspaper sponsored by the PSYWAR division 
attempted to win over the population supporting the insurgents through several means.  
Named SIN LU PAO (New Path News), the new PSYOP sponsored paper’s first 
distribution in September 1948 was to the urban areas, new villages, and the jungle 
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fringe.  The paper carried a combination of messages (based on truth) and news.67  While 
its initial reception was not overly enthusiastic, it eventually became a major force for 
conveying facts and information to the people.68  
During its first months, the pages of the New Path News reflected several 
collisions between policy, PSYOPS and Public Affairs.  For example, the New Path 
News, while mocking the MCP, simultaneously reported several policy decisions that 
caused more damage than good.  First, High Commissioner Gent approved Directive 17C 
in July 1948, which allowed the High Commissioner to deport anyone who was not a 
federal citizen or born in Malaya, which turned out to be the majority of the Chinese 
squatter population.  Regulation 17D, approved in Jan 1949, gave the High 
Commissioner the right to detain anyone suspected of collaborating with the insurgents 
and confining them for up to 90 days without trial.69 .   
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Figure 1.   New Path Newspaper from 1955 (Taken from Derry p. A-15) 
 
The 17E and 17F regulations followed 17D in May 1949, which gave the High 
Commissioner the authority to relocate families without appeal or to banish them to 
mainland China.70 The regulations had an inherent flaw in that they did not discriminate 
between those who willingly helped and those forced to aid the insurgents.  The 
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combination of rapid implementation and lack of discrimination of these new regulations 
quickly created distrust and suspicion between the civilian population and the 
government.  Within a year, “71 people had been executed” under the new regulations.71  
British leaflets reinforced this message with graphic depictions of the consequences for 
both the insurgents and the Chinese population.   
New Path News accurately reported events and administration decisions which 
highlighted another decision by the PSYWAR division to avoid counter propaganda.  At 
this point in the emergency, most MCP propaganda simply emphasized the decisions 
made by the current administration, while the government did not attempt to explain their 
rationale for those decisions.  Major mistakes during operations appeared in the New Path 
News, such as the Batang Kali incident where a British patrol executed 25-suspected 
Chinese collaborators in their own village.72  Conversely, on 29 May, MCP killer squads 
executed a popular teacher and educator, Pho Tee Lai, and his family, yet their killings 
were not reported in the New Path News.73 The problem lay in the reporting.  Both the 
teacher execution and the Batang Kali incident offered similar ramifications to the 
offending side, yet the government failed to publicize the execution of the schoolteacher, 
while the MCP used the government paper as evidence of administration wrongdoing. In 
many respects, this is indicative of the entire early threat based PSYWAR campaign.74  
The early British PSYWAR campaign achieved an effect, which was the opposite of what 
it desired, effectively emphasizing the MCP message while forcing the Chinese 
population away from the government. 
5.  Civil Military Operations (CMO)  
CMO took a different tack from the PSYOPS campaign by taking a measured 
approach to their new responsibilities.  After the initial outbreak of hostilities, one of the 
first items identified by both the military and the police was inadequate knowledge of the 
civilian population they were attempting to influence and defend.75  Up to this point, few 
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ethnic Chinese had accepted identity cards, even though everyone in Malaya had the 
opportunity.  State procedures posed additional complications for ID card acceptance as 
each of the nine states of Malaya had unique forms and processes.76  Police and military 
both believed that the registration process would allow them to separate the law abiding 
from the lawbreakers.77 Another reason was basic knowledge, as significant changes in 
the population demographics, location and infrastructure had occurred during the 
Japanese occupation.  Simply put, the British government was missing key information 
about the Malayan population, its makeup, and location that the registration process could 
provide.  The key points included the following:  
a)  Accurate numbers of the population and their ethnicities. 
b) Location and distribution of the population.  
c) Location of Chinese squatters and contested land. 
d) Food and water sources surveyed 
e) Update maps to reflect camps, roads, trails and paths from pre-war maps 
f) Update infrastructure knowledge.  What services (electricity, water, medical, 
schools, etc.) were available, where and to whom? 
As the British registration process began, the MCP realized that the registration 
would ease the identification of insurgents.  It would also create two additional negative 
effects for the insurgency.  First, for the Malayan people, this was the first time many of 
the people had ever seen government representatives.  The registration became the first 
step in establishing a government presence and started to dispel the perception of a 
distant and uncaring administration.78  Second, the registration served an intelligence 
function by determining population, food, and resource distribution throughout Malaya 
while also facilitating the creating or updating of administration maps.79  
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The MCP realized the implications and attempted to counter the registration.  
Shortly after the registration began in Sept 1948, the insurgents began to tell the villagers 
not to register for ID cards.  The government countered by making the IDs cards an 
access requirement for local medical care.80    The next insurgent plan was to attack the 
registration teams.  The British then provided the teams with armed guards.  The final 
insurgent plan saw them target and begin to assassinate the photographers.81  The 
government countered by providing military photographers who traveled with the 
registration teams an armed escort to each village.  By Dec 1949, the initial registration 
process provided the British administration with an accurate picture of the population, its 
various ethnicities and their distribution.  At the same time, the availability of food, 
water, electricity and medical services were itemized.82  
The registration was the first step in re-establishing British presence in many 
remote parts of Malaya.  While not permanent, the registration teams were the first 
government presence that many of the rural Malay villages had ever seen.  The 
administration determined what it was facing as information from the registration began 
to arrive.  First, numerous, aggressive Royal Navy patrols were not intercepting any food 
shipments for Malaya.83  From this, the British administration determined that the MCP 
was obtaining its food outside Malaya.  Second, the Chinese squatters were consuming 
more food per person in high conflict areas than in areas of lower conflict.84  From these 
two facts, the British determined that the MCP was dependent upon the Min Yuen 
(Chinese squatters) for logistics and resupply.  Postwar records later confirmed that the 
Min Yuen provided the MCP’s food supplies.  This conclusion provided the impetus for 
the village relocation program as a means of cutting insurgent supply lines and 
emphasized the importance of the ongoing registration. 
The registration revealed another key fact to the British administration. By 1949, 
High Commissioner Gurney announced that the squatters constituted a “state within a 
                                                 
80 Komer and United States. Advanced Research Projects Agency., The Malayan Emergency in 
Retrospect; Organization of a Successful Counterinsurgency Effort, 71. 
81 Short, The Communist Insurrection in Malaya, 1948-1960, 142. 
82 Short, The Communist Insurrection in Malaya, 1948-1960, 144. 
83 Short, The Communist Insurrection in Malaya, 1948-1960, 196. 
84 Short, The Communist Insurrection in Malaya, 1948-1960, 177. 
23 
state”.  This was partly due to the Japanese occupation when the ethnic Chinese squatters 
occupied and cleared plots of jungle land simply to survive.  In some areas, the pre-war 
British and wartime Japanese administration had simply failed to stop their advance.85  
When the British re-assumed control in 1945, the MCP (then the MPAJA) retained 
control of the rural areas and constituted the local government. 
To counter MCP control, the British administration decided to relocate the 
Chinese to new villages. While the registration was ongoing, in Sept 1948, the British 
High Commissioner, Sir Henry Gurney presented a basic plan to relocate the Chinese 
squatters to secure, protected villages.86  At this point in relocation planning, the British 
administration did not know the exact number and location of the squatters as the 
registration was still in its initial phase.   The final relocation program design was to 
accomplish four things.  First, it would allow the British to remove two key tenets from 
the MCP’s platform, freedom to till the land and lowering rent.  Information gathered 
during the registration process indicated that if the plan did not include transferring-
deeded land to the former squatters, the probability of success would be virtually zero.  
Second, the registration process drove home to the British administration the fact that 
most of the Chinese squatters were illegally occupying their land.  Third, it would 
reestablish British control over the outlying areas and undermine the unofficial MCP 
government.  Finally, successful relocation would allow the British administration to 
sever the insurgents and their supply lines.  Two unforeseen effects of the registration 
were valuable insight into the popular points of the MCP platform and a better 
understanding of the area of operations and its geographic constraints.   
6. Public Affairs 
Public Affairs (PA) addressed two major issues through public awareness 
programs, the registration process, and the proposed relocation program.  The first major 
problem encountered was the problem of registering the populace.  The government 
waited five months before providing official reasoning for the registration to the local 
populace.87  This delay only created more tension between the Malayan people and the 
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British administration.  This tension was due to the wartime Japanese registration.  The 
wartime registration resulted in young Malayan (native Malay, and ethnic Chinese) men 
and women forced to travel to Burma and work on construction of the Burma railroad.  
The exact number of Malayans lost to this project remains unknown to this day.  
However, this loss of untold men and women was still fresh in the local populace’s mind 
when the British registration began.88  The second problem facing British PA was the 
relocation of Chinese squatters.  The key element in future operations, relocation, also 
had to overcome prior Japanese behavior.  Again, after registration, the Japanese forced 
relocation of Malayans during the war.   
Unfortunately, PA was noticeably absent in these two key areas during the initial 
British response to the Malayan Emergency.  Yet at the same time, British PA and the 
PSYWAR division needed to be educating the Malayan population on the tangible 
benefits of the current government, in spite of its recent policies and directives.  A 
campaign explaining the current directives, registration process and relocation plans to 
the population would have alleviated many Malay fears as to how British policies and 
directives would affect them.  Instead, these policies created unneeded friction as the 
Malays fell back on both their past experiences with the Japanese experience and the 
current MCP propaganda.  
 
D. THE BRIGGS PLAN (1950-1952) 
1. Overview of Events between 1950-1952 
The period between 1950 and 1952 saw the insurgency reach its high water mark.  
However, incorporation of the first lessons from data gathered over the two previous 
years occurred during this period.  April of 1950 was a momentous month for the British 
Government.  The senior war council saw the first appointments of native Malays to its 
numbers.  Retired Lt Gen Harold Briggs arrived to fill the newly created position of 
Director of Operations, with the ability to coordinate the military, police, and civil side of 
the counter-insurgency effort.  As noted, Briggs was a civilian, emphasizing that the 
military was subordinate to the civilian administration.  The key problem not highlighted 
                                                 
88 Short, The Communist Insurrection in Malaya, 1948-1960, 301. 
25 
in Figure 2 below, was Briggs’ lack of formal authority over the civil and police 
functions.  Coinciding with Briggs’ arrival, the insurgents, not seeing a popular uprising 
within the cities, retreated from the urban environment and into the jungle.89   
In May 1950, Briggs presented his plan, which was a series of smaller programs 
with the following aims: 
 a) Separate the insurgents from the people 
 b) Formalize and strengthen the counter-insurgent management 
 c) Deploy the Security Forces on a territorial basis 
 d) Strengthen Intelligence as a key to anti-insurgent ops90  
Plan Organization 
 
Figure 2.   Briggs Plan Organization (taken from Riley Sutherland, Organizing 
Counterinsurgency in Malaya, p. 34) 
 
In order for the Briggs plan to work, Lt Gen Briggs had to revamp the civil 
structure running the war.  Detailed changes are discussed below in the Organizational 
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Changes section.  The most intense insurgent operations of the entire war interrupted 
Brigg’s implementation and civil restructuring.  Reform implementation was slowed 
further by government-scheduled elections in September 1950.  The elections were the 
first held at the town and municipal level as part of the plan to transition control from 
Great Britain to Malaya.91   
In late September 1950, the British had a notable success in the defection of Lam 
Swee, a member of the MCP Central Committee, who had defected earlier in July.  Lam 
Swee was the highest-ranking defector of the entire war.92  In addition, by the end of 
1950, the British had killed 650 guerillas,93 and by 1951, the Briggs plan was gaining 
momentum, while the fighting was reaching a fever pitch.  Briggs’ plan was beginning to 
stress the MCP and cracks in the MCP leadership began to appear in May, when Siew 
Lau, the committee chair for the states of Jahore and Malacca, was executed for 
disagreeing with MCP Central committee on the conduct of the war.94  Almost 
simultaneously, young Chinese students affiliated with the MCP killed their high school 
Headmaster, who was pro-administration, at the Chung Ling High School in Penang.95   
To the local populace, these two events emphasized that an MCP victory would not come 
as easily as believed in early 1948. 
Following the two MCP reverses, the British unwittingly assisted the MCP cause 
between October and December 1951.  The first mistake occurred in late October.  High 
Commissioner Gurney was on his way to the Fraser’s hill resort when his car sped away 
from his military escort and stumbled into an MCP roadside ambush.  Gurney died, and 
the MCP claimed credit for his assassination.  Sir Oliver Lyttleton replaced Gurney in 
Nov 1951.  Shortly afterwards in December 1951, Sir Harold Briggs retired, and an inter-
administration squabble broke out.  The squabble resulted in Police Commissioner Gray 
chief of intelligence, Sir Harold Jenkins, to tender his resignation.  In turn, Oliver 
Lytlleton, the British Colonial Secretary, forcibly removed Commissioner Gray for his 
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poor performance during the insurgency.96  While the Briggs plan began to stress the 
MCP, the insurgents used the British administration squabble to convince the local 
populace that the insurgency was creating similar cracks in the administration. 
2. Organizational Changes 
The appointment of Sir Harold Briggs marked the beginning of a significant 
change in the way that Britain prosecuted the Malayan Emergency.  Briggs was the first 
person to fill the new Director of Operations role.97  Briggs’ new position made him 
responsible for coordinating civil, police, military, naval and air forces.98  For the first 
time, these capabilities were under the control of a single person.  Any service 
questioning a Briggs’ decision could appeal to the current High Commissioner, Sir Henry 
Gurney.99  Upon unifying the military and civilian police under his authority, Briggs next 
remodeled the War Executive Committees.  At the top, he created the Federal War 
Council, responsible for formulating overall policy and allocating resources.  Initially 
Briggs presided over the committee.  However, Lytlleton later replaced him at Briggs’ 
request.  Briggs felt that the having the High Commissioner as the chair added further 
credence to the perception of civilian oversight.100   
At the state level, Briggs created a State War Executive Committee (SWEC), 
which included the senior civil servant (as chairperson), senior police officer, senior 
military officer in addition to the Special Branch (Intelligence), and Home Guard Chief.  
Briggs then created the District War Executive Committee (DWEC), with similar 
representation at the district level (roughly equivalent to an American county).101  A year 
later, in September 1951, Briggs also added the settlement level war executive 
committee.  Authority from these committees flowed from Federal to State to District and 
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finally to the Settlement level.  Policy review occurred at a local level and results then 
flowed from the settlement level to the federal (via the DWEC and SWEC).  These 
committees met weekly and melded civil, police and military actions into a cohesive 
whole across horizontal governmental levels while coordinating national policy vertically 
from the federal down to the settlement level.  Another critical aspect is that each 
committee had discretionary powers limited to its level.  For example, a district 
committee could review and release a leaflet, if within federally determined parameters, 
across the district.  The Committee structure allowed tailoring of national policy, actions, 
and messages for delivery across state, district and settlement lines.  The tailoring 
resulted in messages aimed at groups, ethnicities, and small settlements so that 
individuals could easily discern their place and role in the overall policy.  The 
Committees also allowed the government to act in a “coordinated, integrated, focused, 
and methodical manner across the whole of Malaya.”102  Briggs referred to this as his 
“framework” and became the basis of his new counter-insurgency organization  
3. MILDEC and OPSEC 
During 1950, the British learned that maintaining operational security was 
difficult.  New methods were needed to insert teams covertly.  Early experiments in 1949 
had shown that using paratroops allowed a high degree of mobility, but that the 
insurgents were now watching the few clearings in the jungle where the paratroops could 
land.103  Thus, the insurgents were still able to get advance warning of paratroop arrival 
into their particular region of the jungle.  MILDEC changed this in 1950.  First, the 
British SAS developed a unique tree jumping harness that allowed paratroopers to insert 
through the jungle canopy.104 This usage permitted the paratroops to remain suspended in 
the canopy until after dark, when they would lower themselves to the ground.105  During 
the initial phase of this operation, parachute insertion using the special harness and 
normal parachute missions into clearings started to produce results. 
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The long-range patrols used a second military deception strategy.  After designing 
a preliminary deception campaign, the New Path News published that the typical patrol 
lasted roughly two weeks.106  In reality, the patrols lasted a minimum of 100 days.  In 
some cases, to support the two-week perception, some paratroops would link up with the 
patrols and the same number of troops that began the patrol would return within two 
weeks.  To aid this perception, the paratroops used the same uniforms worn by the 
regular soldiers.  In the meantime, the remaining personnel from the patrol and 
paratroops would continue deeper into the jungle to complete the 100-day mission.  This 
deception resulted in the MCP consistently underestimating the number of patrols 
actively operating in the jungle at any one time. 
The final deception was an evolution of British parachute insertion tactics.  After 
several months, and desperate to counter British tactics, the insurgents realized that the 
number of paratroops could be determined by monitoring the troop transports.  The 
British countered this in late 1951 by putting the paratroops on the loudspeaker aircraft 
performing PSYOP message delivery.  To enhance insurgent confusion, the Royal Air 
Force began to schedule aircraft whose sole purpose was to drop dummy paratroops into 
the jungle.107  After a while, the RAF began to mix live and fake paratroopers.  Thus, the 
insurgents found that monitoring the troop transports was an unreliable means and 
stopped monitoring the transports all together.  By the end of 1951, the insurgents were 
not sure either how or how many British forces were inserted, but had to expend 
additional resources on heightened security.108    
4. Psychological Operations (PSYOP) and Public Affairs 
The first major PSYOP campaign of 1950 was named anti-bandit month, partially 
to counter waning Malayan support of the government in the face of increasing insurgent 
attacks.109 Planned for February of 1950, it backfired on the PSYWAR division.  During 
anti-bandit month insurgent kills increased from 92 in Jan to 123 in February.  However, 
the New Path News (the British government’s own paper) reported that the government 
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lost 103 police and military personnel.  This number was a significant increase from the 
51 lost during the previous month.110  At the same time, the New Path News reported, 
“these numbers do not reflect civilian casualties or those caught in the crossfire”111.  The 
New Path News highlighted the failure of “anti-bandit month” in another report, which 
reported “that overall guerilla recruiting [was] up by over 500%.”112  This lack of 
coordination between PA and PSYOPS severely undermined the overall PSYOP 
campaign.   
Further damage to the Government’s credibility by the New Path News occurred 
with the trial of Jeffrey Watts-Carter.  Watts-Carter was the manager of one of the largest 
rubber plantations in Penang (located in one of the worst states, districts and locales for 
insurgent activity), yet Watts-Carter was able to drive around in an unarmored car.  His 
estate was the only one bordering contested jungle that maintained full production.113  
The British administration accused Watts-Carter of collaborating with the insurgents.  
During the trial, it was determined that the reasons Watts-Carter was able to move freely 
and safely through the district was first, a payoff to the insurgents, as the government 
insinuated, and second, an exceptional relationship with his workers.114  The jury 
acquitted Watts-Carter “when his defense proved that seven percent of the European 
planters had been killed and that the government was not able to protect them.”115  To 
make matters worse, the New Path News reported that the police had tortured beaten and 
imprisoned people for over 4 months while trying to convict Watts-Carter.  116 . 
The disastrous trial and problems with anti bandit month reported in New Path 
News led High Commissioner Gurney to appoint Hugh Carlton-Greene director of the 
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newly created Emergency Information Services in September 1950.117  The Emergency 
Information Services primary purpose was to oversee information released to the 
Malayan public, and, in that regard, to serve a function similar to US military Public 
Affairs.  By the end of September, Carleton-Greene determined that PSYWAR division 
functionality and organization needed review.  After his one-day tour at the end of 
September, Greene told the PSYWAR division “a major change in organization of the 
propaganda machine and the nature of its output is necessary.”118 
At the end of September 1950, Hugh Carlton-Greene approached Lt Gen Briggs 
and received permission to reorganize the PSYWAR and Emergency Information 
Services, as well as institute a radical new information campaign.  In his studies of 
Malaya, Carlton-Greene concluded that the current policies offered little incentive to the 
Chinese squatters to defect or collaborate and, conversely, served as an incentive for the 
insurgents to fight to the death.  Instead, Carlton-Greene proposed rewards for surrender 
policy.119  This offered the first substantive shift in Malayan PSYWAR policy from the 
previous revenge theme underlying the previous PSYOPs campaign.120  Bitterly opposed 
by the police and military, Briggs overrode their objections after local Malay leaders 
convinced him of the potential of the rewards for surrender program.  Prior to his 
proposal to Briggs, Carleton-Greene began to involve local Malay political figures in 
planning.  Tenky Abdul Raman was a leading figure in the Malayan Independence 
movement and publicly supported Great Britain. Raman’s support of Carleton-Greene’s 
program was key in convincing Briggs.121    
To take advantage of this change in policy and to make the marriage of PYSWAR 
and PA more effective, Carlton-Greene changed the objectives of the PSYWAR section.  
Working closely with local political leaders and captured insurgents, they developed a 
new set of objectives to replace the previous revenge theme.   The new objectives were: 
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a. Create distrust and suspicion between leaders and led by stressing gulf 
between the advantages and benefits enjoyed by the MCP elite as 
compared with the latter. 
b. Create doubt in ultimate victory by quoting from captured documents in 
which senior party members expressed uncertainty. 
c. Counter enemy propaganda that those who ‘self-renewed’ [surrendered] 
would be ill-treated or killed when their usefulness to the security forces 
had ended 
d. Promote dissension within units by stressing differences of treatment 
accorded to various ethnic, religious, or racial classes 
e. Encourage desertion by emphasizing the rewards payable to the 
“public” for assisting surrenders and providing information.122 
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Table 1. Scale of Rewards for Defection or Capture in Malaya (in Dollars) (From 
Komer p. 73). 
 
This change in objectives also required a major shift in organizational structure as 
well.  Realizing that the small staff at the top level (never more than 30) could not 
prepare sufficient material, Carlton-Greene shifted the bulk of the propaganda to the state 
and the district level for production.123  The objectives also required another shift 
towards personnel who understood the insurgents, their motivations and organization.  
This translated into a change, which eventually became permanent, for each PSYWAR 
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section.  Each section was “composed of 80% Chinese, 10% Malay, 5% Indian, and 5% 
European, with around 90% of that number being civilian, preferably former 
insurgents.”124  By shifting the bulk of the work to the district and state level, propaganda 
could be prepared faster and tailored to the local region.  Each level had rules to which 
propaganda had to conform.  These new rules allowed each level to move faster than 
previously.125  At the same time, PSYWAR/Emergency Services section hired the 
surrendered MCP Central committee member Lam Swee to work with them.  Briggs then 
directed Carlton-Greene to coordinate the release of all public information and 
propaganda.  At the same time, Carleton-Greene became an invited member of the 
Federal Wartime Emergency Council, so that he could see the development of policy and 
advise the council of possible public ramifications.126  The settlement warfare executive 
committee’s (SWEC) and district warfare executive committee’s (DWEC) structures 
implemented this relationship. 
To further open communications with rebels and the Chinese squatters, Carlton-
Greene increased the number of channels available for distributing information, adding 
ground loudspeakers, plays and personal appearances by surrendered enemy personnel 
(SEP).127  However, surrendered personnel indicated that the leaflet remained the best 
means to communicate with rebels.  In fact, the MCP declared that possession of a British 
leaflet (by an MCP member) as reasonable justification for execution toward the end of 
1951.128  At about the same time, Carlton-Greene started to exploit MCP policies as a 
PSYOP theme against the insurgents, particularly the policy of executing those who 
disagreed with MCP leadership.  Together, these new policies and messages increased 
instability within the MCP ranks.   
In another development, Briggs approved Carlton-Greene’s suggestion to use 
SEPs in message development and further directed that the PSYWAR section have 
immediate access to surrendered personnel as part of their initial interview process.  
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Further, he agreed with Carlton-Greene to declassify the interview transcripts as much as 
possible so that the PSYWAR section could take immediate advantage of the propaganda 
value of SEPs’ defections in their area of operation.129  
As October 1950 ended, Carleton-Greene introduced a full broadcast schedule in 
Malay, Tamil, and four dialects of Chinese, replacing the English and Malay only 
broadcasts.130    The new programming combined the vernacular press and translated 
broadcasts to become the principal means of communicating with the uncommitted 
people of the country.131  Working closely with Carlton-Greene, the PSYWAR and 
Emergency Information services, Radio Malaya focused upon explaining three specific 
themes, the importance of registration, how the resettlement would occur, and countering 
the growing perception by Malays that the Chinese were shown favoritism in 
infrastructure construction.  PA worked with Civil Military Operations and PSYWAR to 
ensure that the following five objectives in policy and actions matched.  Those objectives 
were: 
 a. Resettling squatters into compact groups 
 b. Strengthening of the local administration 
 c. Establishing police posts in these areas 
 d. Provision of roads and communication in these areas 
e. Exploiting these measures with good propaganda, both constructive and 
destructive.132  
This ensured synchronization of message, policy, and actions across the settlement, 
district, state, and federal levels of Malaya.  To further this message, Carleton Green had 
500 radios distributed by December 1951, many of which were the first radios ever seen  
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by the villagers.  In fact, once installed these radios became the only source of 
communications for the villages.133  What is interesting is that these radios could also 
receive Radio Peking.   
The capability to hear both stations was part of the larger PSYOP designed to 
appeal to the materialistic urge of the rural Chinese.  The British radios created two 
PSYOP problems for the MCP.  First, only senior MCP officials possessed radios.  
Second, MCP radios could only receive Radio Peking.  At the same time, the radios led 
to increasing village suspicion about the true MCP agenda.134  The rural Chinese knew 
that the MCP had radios only for the party elite, and yet, ordinary people had access to 
radios under the British government.135 
5. Civil Military Operations 
Upon reviewing the data accumulated as part of the registration and resettlement 
efforts, Briggs laid out a sweeping plan for food and drug control, aimed at breaking the 
logistic links between the jungle-based insurgents and their Min Yuen support in 
populated areas. Administered by the SWEC and DWEC, the system enforced black 
areas (those with heavy insurgent activity) strict rationing, curfews, and village gate 
checks.  Mobile food-check teams enforced strict accounting of all stocks and sales of 
specified items in stores.  Identification cards were mandatory for purchasing food, and 
records were maintained on all sales.136   
The key to making the food and drug denial work was the resettlement plan begun 
in 1948.  Briggs revitalized the relocation plan, and by the end of 1950, “82 villages with 
117,000 people had been moved.  The relocation number increased to 429 villages and 
395,000 people by the end of 1951”137.  The reason for this renewed emphasis was that 
the preliminary data revealed that recruitment from the Chinese villages had increased 
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from “less than 5% in 1948 to between 10 and 30% of the insurgent’s total force.”138  
The government also suspected that casualties were trailing recruitment in all states.139  
To ensure the success of the program, High Commissioner Gurney received 
approval to implement Emergency Regulation 17FA, which gave state and settlement 
authorities the power to declare areas as controlled areas.  The main purpose was to 
concentrate the population of such an area at night in specific areas, in part, to provide a 
means of protecting the population from the insurgents while simultaneously cutting 
communications and support to the insurgents.140  To entice the Chinese to relocate to the 
new villages, villagers received a stipend while they waited for their first crop, one sixth 
of an acre for a home, and a minimum amount of deeded land for planting.  The villager 
received additional deeded land if the minimum land was less than what the villager had 
in the old village.141  By combining land ownership and security with access to medical 
facilities, water, electricity, and schooling in each village, the CMO effectively removed 
several of the key points underpinning the MCP justification for the insurgency. 
 
E. TURNING THE TIDE (1952-1954) 
1. Overview of Events between 1952-1954 
Unlike Briggs, his replacement Gerald Templar, prior to accepting the Malayan 
posting asked for complete authority.  Winston Churchill combined the Director of 
Operations and High Commissioner positions and offered Templar the revamped High 
Commissioner job.142  In early February 1952, Lt Gen Gerald Templar replaced Briggs.  
After reviewing the situation in Malaya and talking with Briggs, Templar concluded, 
much as Briggs did, that this was primarily a political campaign.143  Additionally, with 
the movement towards independence gaining momentum, Templar developed an 
                                                 
138 Short, The Communist Insurrection in Malaya, 1948-1960, 213. 
139 Short, The Communist Insurrection in Malaya, 1948-1960. 
140 Short, The Communist Insurrection in Malaya, 1948-1960, 249. 
141 Komer and United States. Advanced Research Projects Agency., The Malayan Emergency in 
Retrospect; Organization of a Successful Counterinsurgency Effort, 54. 
142 "Smiling Tiger," Time, Dec 15, 1952 1952. 
143 Short, The Communist Insurrection in Malaya, 1948-1960, 339. 
38 
information campaign to educate native Malays about sharing power in the government, 
if it was to succeed.  At the same time, Templar had to start transitioning Malayan civil 
service from a predominantly European operation to one run by the Malays.  By the end 
of 1956, Templar initiated reforms that reduced European representation to only 1800 in 
a service of over 160,000.144  In May 1952, Templar proposed legislation implementing 
the election of councils in the new villages created by the resettlement policy.  In 
September 1952, he created a new policy that offered citizenship to over half the ethnic 
Indians and Chinese.145  Templar then followed this success with new legislation 
proposing an electoral process for state legislative councils elected from the newly 
established village councils.  Seen as enhancements, Templar’s actions did not effectively 
change Briggs’ plan.   
Templar took command after the heaviest period of insurgent activity had ended 
in December 1951.  However, the insurgents had retreated deeper into the jungle to 
regroup and this placed tremendous pressure on the aborigine groups whom the MCP was 
forcing not only to work, but also to provide food and security to their camps.  In a 
departure from the previous policy of relocation, beginning in August 1952, Templar 
established deep jungle forts to protect the aborigines.146    Templar did not relocate the 
aborigines, as it was easier to protect than to relocate them.   
The MCP began 1952 with over 7,000 insurgents; however, the Briggs plan was 
beginning to have an effect.  During 1952, total contacts with the MCP declined from 
450-500 per month at the beginning of 1952 to less than 100 per month by the end of 
1952.147  At the same time, the deep jungle forts established to protect the aborigines 
were beginning to take their toll on the MCP forces.  By the end of 1953, the total 
insurgent force fell to less than 2,000.148    At the same time, civilian and security force 
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casualties declined dramatically (see Table 1) while maintaining a high MCP casualty 
rate.  Table 1 demonstrates that during 1951, 1.74 insurgents were killed for every single 
security force officer lost.  At the same time, roughly one civilian was lost for every two 
insurgents.  By the close of 1953, those ratios had improved to 8.11 insurgents per 
officer, while only one civilian was lost for every 11.85 insurgents killed.  This is a 
remarkable improvement in only two years. 
 
Table 2. Casualties, Incidents and Contacts during 1948-1955 (From Short p. 507). 
 
2. Organizational Changes 
There were really only two significant changes in the organizational structure.  
First, Templar was a military officer serving as the High Commissioner (Senior Civilian 
post) further unifying the military and civilian functions.  This unification of authority 
resolved one of Lt Gen Briggs’ greatest problems, by eliminating the previous appeal 
option that Briggs had to contend with under Gurney.149  Templar’s second major 
innovation was to create a single director of intelligence who oversaw the civilian, 
military and police intelligence functions.  What made this new position unique was that 
the director of intelligence was primarily responsible for analysis and had little to do with 
actual collection. Templar created this division of responsibility specifically to let the 
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collectors focus on collection with all questions and requests for analysis routed to the 
new Director of Intelligence.  The analysts were now responsible for analyzing data and 
producing estimates etc.  “This let the military and police focus on gathering intelligence 
versus answering questions from on high”150 
3. Electronic Warfare and MILDEC 
During 1953, the MCP introduced a new type of radio for communications 
amongst senior MCP officials.  However, the new radio allowed a much more accurate 
triangulation than was possible before.151  In fact, the triangulation was accurate enough 
that it could successfully guide RAF heavy bombers.  To prevent civilian casualties, the 
Special Police would verify that the MCP camp was not holding captive civilians and 
would smuggle homing beacons into the camps.152  When the bombers approached, if the 
radio signal and the beacon were present, approval to strike the camp was automatic.  The 
result was that several hundred insurgents were killed using this technique.153  
The British took this new EW technique one-step further.  They activated a 
MILDEC plan focused on the MCP leadership.  The objective was to convince the MCP 
leadership that the British were getting their information from high-level members of the 
MCP.  Through information obtained from surrendered enemy personnel, the British 
leaked that certain high-ranking members of the MCP had left the camps just prior to the 
RAF strikes.  In the end, the MCP did not figure out the EW methodology being used and 
instead executed 11 mid level officials for leaking information to the British.154   
4. OPSEC 
MCP food production produced the only significant change in OPSEC.  The 
insurgents were driven deeper into the jungle as food denial operations began to have an 
effect, and neatly cultivated plots of land began to appear in the deep jungle.  This style 
of farming was typical of ethnic Chinese and not the aborigines.  Once known, patrols 
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destroyed the plots of land and crops.  At the suggestion of the PSYOP section, large 
plots were destroyed just short (no more than two weeks) of maturity to further intensify 
the damage to MCP morale.155   
Due to a lack of proper operations security, the greatest loss of personnel on both 
sides in a single action occurred during this period.  On the government side, a patrol 
leader chose the same trail to and from the jungle three times.  The MCP ambushed the 
patrol leader, and his patrol lost over thirty personnel.156  On the MCP side, two different 
patrols repeated their route in returning to their camp.  In both cases, government forces 
ambushed the MCP patrols, with one MCP patrol losing over 60 personnel.157  Each side 
remembered this lesson, and patrol patterns avoided predictability for the rest of the 
Emergency. 
5. Psychological Operations 
As mentioned earlier, civilian casualties decreased during the 1952-1954 period.  
The establishment of any new village incorporated a perimeter fence and a rigid curfew 
was enforced.  Guards checked workers at the gate prior to exit, to prevent food from 
leaving the village.  The PSYOPs section took advantage of this when they created a new 
campaign targeting the residents of the new villages.  Encouraging the villagers to take 
advantage of the checkpoint and the fence, the PSYOP section provided a means for the 
villagers to deny food to the insurgents while placing blame for it on the government, 
thus reducing the risk to the villagers.158  At the same time, the transfer of deeded land 
for homes and farming to the villagers mitigated two key portions of the MCP PSYOP 
campaign.     
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Figure 3.   Surrendered Insurgents One Month After Capture (From Derry, p. B-1) 
 
PSYOPS began to emphasize the decline of the MCP with government films 
featuring a combination of well-known surrendered insurgents and those from the local 
area of the village.  Another PSYOP program rotated the better-known insurgents 
through the contested areas to prove to the people that they were alive and well, in 
keeping with the government promise.  Subtle points to the photos and visits included 
clothing, obvious weight gain, the simple fact they were alive, and doing well under the 
British.159  An example is shown in Figure 3. 
The PSYOPS campaign was also working on the MCP, and as mentioned above, 
the combination of air strikes and MILDEC allowed for the creation of further dissension 
within the MCP ranks.  At the same time, the PSYOPS section began to capitalize further 
upon the rewards-for-surrender program.  Starting in late 1952, the MCP began executing 
MCP personnel for possessing their surrender leaflets.160 Jeeps with large speakers drove 
near the jungle fringe to transmit the British surrender message.161  Jeep access was 
limited to roads, roads that did not exist in the deep jungle where the MCP bases were 
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located.  Instead, voice aircraft replaced the jeeps, flying over the deep jungle 
broadcasting the same surrender message.  The surrender message also provided a catch 
phrase for the insurgent to provide on his/her surrender.162   
Another refinement was in the PSYOP messages.  At this point, according to 
Derry, there were five primary messages in usage 
 “a. Where did the money go? 
 b. Why work against the interests of the masses? 
 c. It is dangerous to carry a pistol or a carbine. 
 d. One of your comrades has been killed in this area? 
 e. Do you need medical assistance?”163 
Theme d. was quite interesting in that, not only would the PSYOP section announce who 
had been killed by the government during operations, but would also include who had 
been executed for possessing, reading or doing something the MCP found offensive.164  
As these were standardized procedures, as Briggs envisioned them, these tailored leaflets 
differed across districts.  This particular theme was the single most effective leaflet in the 
inventory of messages designed to induce the surrender of individual insurgents.165 
6. Civil Military Operations 
In a refinement of the Briggs plan on food denial, Templar decided that the 
security forces should focus their efforts on the guerilla supply parties operating near the 
jungle fringe to force the insurgents to commit resources to defending their supply 
organizations.  A secondary effect was to force the MCP to divert additional resources to 
producing the necessary food.166  Che The, the MCP senior official countered with an  
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aphorism “the guerillas moves among the people like a fish swims through the ocean.”167  
Templar pointed out that food denial and civil programs “would create shallows where 
the fish could be found easily.”168 
Standardized ID forms (for receiving an ID card) for all of Malaya denied the 
insurgents any ability to move among the population.  This change eliminated insurgent 
exploitation of the last seam in the system.169  By January 1953, 535 new villages had 
been created, relocating 563,000 people, and by the end of 1953, another 84 villages 
would be created.170  The relocation proved highly effective in separating the villagers 
from the insurgents. 
The next phase was the creation of white areas and black areas.  By 1953, in some 
areas designated as white areas, insurgent activity had practically ceased.  In a white area, 
residents were not subject to emergency restrictions or regulations.  In comparison, black 
areas continued to enforce all the regulations and restrictions.  In fact, the definition of 
what constituted a white area closely agrees with what Mao would define as a base 
area.171  The establishment of white areas delivered yet another blow to the insurgent 
campaign, which had yet to establish a secure base area.  Contrast this insurgent failure 
with the government which actively advertised its success in doing exactly what the 
insurgents had been attempting to do for the last 4 years. 
7. Public Affairs (PA) 
Public affairs had a challenging role of keeping the population informed of what 
was going on and why the selected measures were necessary. The food denial programs 
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programs provided a legitimate means for villagers to refuse food to the insurgents.172  
PA also disseminated the village requirements for designation as a white area to the local 
populace.173  
Carlton-Greene ordered another 700 radios for installation in new and old villages 
speed the dissemination of word-of-mouth messages.174  Radio Malaya programming 
was still restricted primarily to news, to increase credibility, but the installed radios still 
provided access to the Radio Peking.  This distribution widened the chasm between the 
Min Yuen and the MCP insurgents, as radios within the MCP were still limited to large 
formations and could only receive Radio Peking.  The message conveyed as part of the 
larger information campaign was “why work against the masses.”175  By this point, over 
1200 villages had received radios and had daily access to news programs from both sides.  
From an insurgent viewpoint, it also heightened the sense that the MCP had something to 
hide due to the limited access given MCP members.  The MCP reinforced this perception 
by implementing harsh penalties in June 1952 for possessing leaflets or listening to Radio 
Malaya broadcasts.176    
The distribution of radios and openness shown by the British government created 
two developments that PA had to counter.  The first created a new tactic for the MCP.  In 
June of 1952, the MCP shifted their tactics from the adults in the villages to the Chinese 
students in the middles schools.  The MCP began to infiltrate the ethnic Chinese schools.  
The ramifications of this shift in policy did not become apparent until 1954 when the 
students began to attack pro-government educators.  The second development was the 
government plan to begin educating the populace that a unified government which 
represented all was better than one based upon a single dominant ethnicity.177  Templar 
forced alliances between the various Malay factions to further the single unified 
government.  At the same time, debate and discussions featuring panels of respected local 
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academics debated the issues using the radio as a means for the entire nation to 
participate.  This second development was critical in Templar’s mind for establishing a 
successful and stable government, versus one beset with various tensions or civil wars. 
At the insistence of the PSYWAR division, the British Emergency Information 
Services (PA) initiated another campaign to broadcast visits of the best-known insurgents 
to relocated villages.  This sent four messages: first that the government cared and was in 
control.  Second, the government had kept their word and insurgents from 1948 were still 
alive and well, which further implied that the government could provide effective 
security. Third, it also made the MCP look incapable of stopping the government.  
Finally, in the case of Lam Swee, the most famous of the surrendered insurgents, it 
dramatically reduced insurgent recruiting and support from the relocated villages.178  
 
F. MOPPING UP (1954-1960) 
1. Overview of Events from 1954-1960 
In 1954, General Sir Geoffrey Bourne replaced Templar and remained the senior 
British official until Malaya became independent on August 31, 1957.179  The first of 
Templar’s proposed state elections occurred in 1954 under Bourne.  The last state 
election (of nine states) was in 1955.   In Nov of 1955, the federal election selected a 
representative body at the top level.  This election replaced all European officials with 
Malayan throughout the civil administration.  By 1958, the 200 man Aborigine Strike 
Force killed more insurgents than all the other forces combined.180   Table 3 shows the 
reduction in civilian casualties from the earlier table.  Table 3 also shows the number of 
major and minor incidents continued to decrease until the Malayan Emergency ended in 
July of 1960.181    
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The final military push from the MCP came on an unexpected front, in the 
schools of Malaya.  The execution of several senior administrators of Chinese High 
Schools in 1954 alerted the British Administration to the new MCP front.  During 1954, 
1955 and 1956, the British administration discovered several large MCP cells in different, 
large, mostly Chinese high schools across Malaya.  To counter this, Bourne and his 
Malayan successors, used a variety of programs to combat the MCP incursion into the 
high Schools.   
 
 
Table 3. Casualties, Incidents and Contacts  during 1956-1960 (From Short p. 508) 
 
2. Psychological Operations 
Templar’s administration developed the concept of a peace offensive.  However, 
it remained for Lt Gen Bourne to implement the peace offensive during his tenure.  “The 
new PSYOPs campaign used a general amnesty which would be offered to all the 
insurgents.  It used a combination of well-known and respected figures making radio and 
newspaper appeals.  Communiqués from states were issued showing enthusiastic 
response to the proposal and stressing the political and economic advantages of a return 
to normality hoping to induce popular acceptance of the offer.”182  The peace offensive 
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became the new overall theme behind the PSYOPS program.  As the insurgent numbers 
decreased, the focus of the PSYOP program shifted from groups to individuals.  
Increased emphasis on group photos further emphasized surrendered insurgents peaceful 
coexistence with the government years after laying down their arms.183  
For the insurgents who did not cooperate, the government resorted to other means.  
First, the government would surround an insurgent area.  Then, the government offered 
insurgents the opportunity to surrender.  Message delivery was through assorted means 
such as radio, voice, speaker aircraft, leaflet, and contact with villagers.  The troops 
would withdraw for a period of three days.  At the end of three days, the troops moved 
back into the area and killed all remaining insurgents.  If captured, insurgents went to 
prison on extended sentences.184  In 1956, the Peace offensive began under Bourne; it 
was completed by the Government of Malaya in 1960.185   
3. Civil Military Operations 
By 1954, the relocation program approached completion.  Over thirty percent of 
the villages provided their own protection.  In some areas, village guards were down to 
standby status as the size of white areas increased.186  The increase in white areas 
allowed Bourne to begin another step, which was the establishment of a common 
educational system across Malaya.  Bourne created school management committees using 
locally elected parents and school administrators to enforce common standards.  This was 
the final unifying step taken by the British for the sole purpose of breaking down the 
ethnic barriers.187 
4. Public Affairs 
In 1955, to counter the MCP push into the Chinese High Schools, Bourne used a 
combination of measures to counter the violent MCP students.  To begin with, an 
assortment of new channels to the high school and pre-high school populations was 
established.  Specifically, the government began sponsoring sports competitions, essay 
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contests, debating societies, supervised moonlight parties and excursions for teenagers.188  
After several months of investigation, the government identified several MCP support 
groups.  Once identified, the government was able to take the students into custody 
without violence.  At the same time, the school management committees began 
identifying those teachers known to have MCP ties.  As simply being communist was not 
a crime in Malaya; the local populace revoked teachers’ credentials instead.189  
The school problem was initially identified as a predominantly Chinese issue.  
Later investigation confirmed no other ethnicities had suffered this problem.  However, 
the British used the school issue as the reason for pushing a common educational system.  
While publicly using the reasons mentioned, the real purpose was to break up the large 
specialized Chinese schools and integrate the entire population at an early age.  At the 
same time, well-known community and public figures became involved and assisted the 
integration campaign.  These community figures managed to convince other Chinese 
business leaders to abandon their fence sitting attitudes to the emergency.190  
 
G. SUMMARY (1948-1960) 
By ignoring the warning signs prior to 1948, the British administration of Malaya 
was unprepared when the actual Emergency began.  For the next two years, British policy 
and actions were more reactionary than indicative of considered planning.  In fact, the 
British theme of revenge characterized the first two years of the Malayan Emergency.  
During this period, the MCP’s only strategic failure was expecting an uprising in the 
urban areas in support of the insurgency.  This failure allowed the British to gain time to 
begin implementing policies that would eventually become the foundation of a successful 
counterinsurgency.  The key British action was to begin a registration of the Malayan 
population.  The registration gave the British administration the ability to build a picture 
of the Malayan battle space.    
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The arrival of Lt Gen Harold Briggs (ret.) in 1950 signaled a significant change in 
the Malayan Emergency.  Briggs realized that the Emergency was a politically motivated 
conflict.  He also realized, based upon initial data from the registration begun in 1948, 
that the key to winning was to separate the insurgents from their supporters within the 
Malayan populace.  Briggs personnel planned an IO campaign as the means to create 
such a wedge 
Briggs also realized that the British Malayan Administration was not capable of 
separating the insurgents from the population base.  This colonial administration did have 
good knowledge of the local customs and languages, and the lack of coordination 
between the civil, political, police and military branches provided a seam that the MCP 
insurgents were successfully exploiting.  Prior to his arrival, British administrators 
decided to create a new position, the Director of Operations.  Briggs was able to begin 
integrating civil, military, political, and police actions to provide a cohesive message of 
policy and actions.  Unfortunately, the new position also allowed each branch to appeal to 
the high commissioner as the ranking civilian authority in Malaya.  This appeal process 
slowed Briggs’ response to insurgent actions.  On the positive side, Briggs was able to 
replace civilian, police and political appointees. 
Building upon the registration begun in 1948; Briggs also began the planning and 
implementation of the relocation plan which was critical to the eventual success of 
Britain in Malaya.  At the same time, Briggs replaced key personnel in the PSYWAR 
division and revamped the civil, military, political and police administration.  Previously, 
the lack of coordination amongst the elements of the administration had provided a seam 
that the insurgents were able to exploit.  During Briggs’ watch, the insurgent campaign 
reached a high water mark with the increasing number of attacks and the assassination of 
the High Commissioner Hugh Gurney. 
In 1952, Lt Gen Gerald Templar, Briggs’ replacement refined Briggs basic plan 
and furthered its implementation.  During his tenure, Templar saw insurgent numbers 
fall, attacks decrease and the insurgents driven deeper into the jungle.  Templar also 
oversaw the beginning of the transition from British control to Malay control.  Continued 
integration of former insurgents into the British PSYWAR campaign increased the 
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effectiveness of PSYWAR.  Templar continued to improve civil military integration and 
to tune the IO campaign for maximum effect.  While cracks in the MCP had appeared 
under Briggs, they became chasms under Templar.   
General Sir Geoffrey Bourne, who replaced Templar, was the final British officer 
to serve in Malaya and oversaw the transition from British to Malay control.  At the same 
time, he completed the relocation program begun under Briggs.  Bourne changed the 
emphasis of the IO campaign from separating the insurgents and their support base to one 
of peace.  He also oversaw the final campaign against the insurgents and their deep jungle 
bases.  In 1960, the new Malayan government declared the emergency at an end. 
 
H. LESSONS FROM MALAYA 
1. Insurgency  
Sir Harold Briggs recognized that the insurgency he was facing in Malaya 
differed significantly from recent conflicts like World War II.  WWII and the Malayan 
Emergency both centered on clashing belief systems.  However, the means to success 
were diametrically opposite.  In the case of WWII, defeating the axis governments 
resulted in the defeat of the nation.  This is markedly different from the Malayan 
Emergency where two parties were fighting to become the Malayan population’s choice 
for governance.  This conceptual difference was the underlying reason for Briggs’ earlier 
comment that the Malayan Emergency was primarily a political campaign.   
2. Message  
The Malayan Emergency demonstrated that the ability of a ruling government to 
deliver a coherent message, seamlessly coordinated through words and policy, is critical 
to a successful counter-insurgency.  The message that the British delivered to the 
Malayan populace was simply, “the government is your friend.”191  This ability to 
connect with the Malayan people was the result of vertical and horizontal coordination 
across the Malayan government structures.  The ability to meld civil, military and police  
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policies and actions transmitted a message heard loud and clear by the Malayan 
population.  The MCPs inability to offer a better or at least equal message resulted in 
their eventual downfall. 
3. Public Affairs 
PA was a key message channel during the Malayan Emergency.  PA’s role was 
critical and evolved as the conflict progressed.  In the initial phase, it explained 
government reasoning behind the registration and relocation of the populace. PA was 
able to explain why both government programs were beneficial to the local population.  
Later, PA, in conjunction with Radio Malaya, conveyed accurate news about important 
local issues to the Malayan population.  In that regard, providing access to news and a 
simple radio served as a means of driving another wedge between the insurgents and their 
supporting population base.192  Carleton-Greene let the radios receive Radio Malaya and 
Radio Peking.  This deliberate action allowed the population to listen to both sides of the 
argument and make an educated choice about which side to support.  PA provided a 
peaceful means that allowed villagers to deny support to the MCP insurgents.   
4. Decentralized Planning 
One of the primary lessons of the Malayan Emergency was the value of 
decentralized planning.  One of the problems the British administrations faced was 
synchronizing the message across nine states which had populations composed of 
Chinese, Malay, and Indian, along with a religious mix of Christianity, Buddhism and 
Islam.  Timeliness and relevance were important considerations as well.  The ability to 
tailor a message for a region down to a settlement level was critical in the overall success.  
Early in the conflict, Hugh Carleton-Greene realized that centralizing this process would 
create unacceptable delays, negating any advantage that PSYOPs could create.   
Fortunately, Lt Gen Briggs recognized this same issue.  This was one reason for the 
creation of the district warfare executive and settlement warfare executive committees for 
coordinating government policies and actions vertically (from federal down to settlement) 
and horizontally (across police, civil and military).  Working closely together, Briggs and 
Carleton-Greene created guidelines that allowed the lower levels to create and distribute 
PSYOP leaflets faster than the MCP.  By the end of the conflict, MCP insurgents 
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discovered that the government had better knowledge of their losses than their own 
leadership.  By the end of the emergency, this decentralized planning was key in being 
able to focus PSYWAR efforts on individuals versus a movement.  In the end, this 
decentralization allowed the government to react faster than the MCP, creating the 
perception of a force that would eventually win out over the insurgents. 
5. Technology 
The Malayan Emergency provides lessons in the use of technology as well.  
Initially, the British deployed sophisticated equipment to monitor MCP radio traffic, only 
to find little MCP activity.  As the war progressed, EW found applications as the MCP 
fielded slightly more sophisticated radio equipment.  However, for the most part, 
sophisticated direction finding, signals intelligence and EW capabilities were not 
applicable.  The lesson is that the British possessed a technological capability, which did 
not confer any significant advantage to them.  This was not for a lack of capability on 
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III. JOINT IO DOCTRINE VIEWED THROUGH MALAYAN 
EXPERIENCE 
Generally, doctrine is historically derived, in that it is the synthetic 
product of actual experience in previous conflicts”193 
Doctrine provides the guidance on how the United States military determines 
resource allocation, preferred techniques, and means by which combatant commanders 
are responsible for implementing the best practices that US military forces have learned 
collectively in past wars.  This chapter will examine the American doctrine in support of 
counterinsurgency operations through the lens of the Malayan lessons identified in 
Chapter two. 
When examining our doctrine for Information Operations and Insurgency, the 
following doctrinal documents applied to this thesis. They are:  
JP 1-0 Joint Warfare for the Armed Forces of the United States 
JP 3.0 - Doctrine for Joint Operations, JP3-07 – Military Operations other than 
war 
JP 3-07.1 Procedures for Foreign Internal Defense, JP 3-08 Vol. 1 and 2 
Procedures for Interagency Coordination 
JP 3-13 Information Operations (two versions, the current one dated 9 Oct 1998 
and the draft used for this thesis) 
JP 3-13.1 Command and Control Warfare 
JP 3-16 Multinational Operations 
JP 3-51 Electronic Warfare 
JP3-53 Psychological Operations 
JP 3-54 Operations Security 
JP 3-57 Civil Military Operations 
                                                 
193 Larry E. Cable, Conflict of Myths: The Development of American Counterinsurgency Doctrine and 
the Vietnam War (New York: New York University Press, 1986), vii. 
56 
JP 3-57.1 Civil Affairs, JP 3-58 Military Deception 
JP 3-61 Public Affairs in Joint Operations.  
 
A. US JOINT DOCTRINE FOCUS 
When reviewing the majority of Joint Doctrine, it became clear that “the services 
self-concepts determine not only how they prepare for war, but how flexible they will be 
in responding to unexpected situations when that war occurs.”194  The basis of the 
majority of Joint Doctrine is large-scale conflict.  Thus, the focus of how the United 
States Armed Forces are organized is based upon large-scale conflicts.  This can be seen 
in the types and variety of documents that relate directly to large-scale conflict, including 
fire support, forcible entry, space, air mobility, laser designation, amphibious assault, 
amphibious embarkation (separate document on how to load the ships for the assault) and 
suppression of enemy air defenses.  Yet only two of the newest documents, Foreign 
Internal Defense (JP 3-07.1 in 2004) and Urban Operations (JP 3-06 in 2002), relate 
directly to insurgency. 
 
B. INSURGENCY 
Low Intensity Conflict has been more common throughout the history of 
warfare than has conflict between nations represented by armies on a 
“conventional” field of battle.195 
Insurgency as we know it today is neither a new phenomenon nor a recent one.  
Once classified as rebellions or revolutions, insurgencies have long existed in the past.  
During the twentieth century, the United States has been involved in multiple 
counterinsurgency efforts.  The Hukbalahap rebellion in the Philippines, Vietnam, 
Afghanistan and Iraq show recent US involvements in counterinsurgencies.  The British, 
based on lessons from the Malayan emergency, treat insurgency as a different form of 
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war.  Counterinsurgency techniques and methodology are fundamentally different from 
conventional conflict.196 Based simply upon frequent US involvement, one could expect 
that US doctrine would address counter-insurgency. This section will review the relevant 
joint doctrine, IO doctrine, and identify the problems associated with the IO and 
insurgency documents as whole.  
In reviewing the joint publications, insurgency and counterinsurgency are both 
mentioned, primarily in our doctrine for Joint Operations (JP 3.0), Military Operations 
other than war (JP 3-07) and Procedures for Foreign Internal Defense (JP 3-07.1). Of all 
the joint doctrine for operations, the one for Foreign Internal Defense mentions 
“insurgency” 82 times.  If all the insurgency references in the doctrine documents 
examined by this thesis are combined, the three JP’s (JP 3.0, 3-07 and 3-07.1) count for 
82.6% of the references.  This means that for the remaining nine documents, 
“insurgency” is mentioned roughly once every 90 pages (23 refs over 1998 pages).  
Granted this in and of itself is not critical if the context in which the word is used is 
relevant. 
The Malayan Emergency demonstrated the importance of a tightly integrated and 
clearly defined IO campaign within a counterinsurgency.  However, the current IO 
doctrine creates the opposite effect, particularly in how IO is organized.  There are 
currently three doctrinal templates in existence for the services to use.  The first and 
oldest is JP 3-13.1 on Command and Control Warfare, the second is JP 3-13 Joint 
Doctrine for Information Operations dated 8 October 1998.  The final template is the 
draft replacement for JP 3-13.  If the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs signed the draft 
document, his signature would eliminate two of these three documents.  However, it has 
been in final coordination for roughly two years.  Most service organizations closely 
resemble that of the draft JP 3-13, though it is not official guidance yet. 
The IO documents are particularly relevant in terms of their role within counter-
insurgency.  As a key means of influencing a target population, these documents as a 
group do not distinguish between major conflict and insurgency.  In some cases, their 
guidance is simply wrong.  For example, Figure 4 is common to JP 3.0 Doctrine for Joint 
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Operations, JP 3-13.1 Command and Control Warfare, and JP 3-57 Civil Military 
Operations.197  What is interesting is that Figure 3 lists counterinsurgency as a non-
combat mission.  Current losses of US troops in Iraq highlight the falsity of this 
perception.   
 
Figure 4.   Range of Military Operations (From JP 3.0 p. 20 and JP 3-13.1 p. I-5) 
 
Using the Iraq example again, JP 3-0 later states that the US military does not 
usually engage in counter-insurgency. This assertion flies in direct contrast to the US 
military’s experience in Vietnam, and the ongoing situations in Iraq and Afghanistan.  All 
three primary publications also specify that the military will support insurgencies or 
support counter-insurgency as directed by our government.198 In that regard, some of the 
newer documents such as JP 3-58 (2001) and JP 3-07.1 (2004) are starting to show 
improvement in this area.   
Improvements aside, however, the IO and insurgency doctrine documents as a 
whole suffer from two problems.  First, there is no service lead established for the 
insurgency mission, which means that there is no advocate to fight for funding and 
resources to support this area.  It is interesting to note that we have a service lead for 
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specialized operations such as embarking troops for an amphibious assault, yet counter-
insurgency is lumped with unconventional warfare under Army.  Second, lack of 
guidance lets the services determine internal resources for this mission: for example, the 
Marine Corps formalized counter-insurgency in MCWP 33.5.199 Third, the Army has not 
clearly established its role as the lead service.  The Marine Corps also produces and 
distributes to Marine officers an updated version of the 1940 Small Wars Manual based 
on Marine Corps counter-insurgency experiences in 1930’s Nicaragua.  In contrast, the 
army is drafting new counterinsurgency guidance, while the USAF and the Navy do not 
have doctrine for counterinsurgency at all.   
However, considering the frequency of US involvement in insurgency or counter-
insurgency, it makes sense, that someone should be in charge of coordinating COIN 
resources.  One service should be in charge and define the other services’ supporting 
responsibilities defined.  Once defined, services could focus upon specific training 
requirements and resources in support of counterinsurgency.  Joint doctrine provides a 
means to coordinate the focus of multiple services and would produce an integrated effort 
better able to support a Joint Force Commander during a counter-insurgency. 
 
C. MESSAGE 
The most important lesson from the Emergency that remains relevant 
today is the importance of being ‘propaganda minded’ with all personnel 
involved in the campaign, from the government officials, police to 
soldiers, especially at the grassroots level, emanating the same message to 
ordinary Malayans, that the government was their friend200 
The quote from Kumar Ramakrishna, the head of Singapore’s Institute of Defence 
and Strategic Studies highlights the success that Britain had in transmitting a single 
cohesive message to the Malayan People.  As such, US ability to transmit a similar 
message is critical.  The prerequisites to do this do not exist in US doctrine for three 
reasons: artificial constraints, local involvement and decentralized planning.  
Decentralized planning will be discussed in section E of this paper. 
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The British concept of PSYWAR is markedly different from the US version of 
PYSOP.  After several incidents in early 1950, the British brought in a Military 
Deception specialist named Hugh Carleton-Greene.201  Originally, Carleton-Greene was 
to run the British emergency information services providing PA support to the British in 
Malaya.  Shortly after his arrival, Carleton-Greene assumed overall command of the 
British PSYWAR operation for PSYOPS and PA.  Carleton-Greene effectively became 
the coordinator for the message developed and disseminated through PA and PSYOP 
methodologies.202  One of the products that Carleton-Greene inherited was the New Path 
News, a paper distributed throughout Malaya.  An example of this paper is in Figure 1.  
What is interesting is that the paper had articles from both PA and the PSYOP section.203  
Another available medium was Radio Malaya, discussed earlier in this paper.  Together, 
the integration of all capabilities allowed the British to create and disseminate a cohesive 
message in a timely manner. 
US doctrine states that PA and PSYOP will coordinate to make sure those 
messages will not conflict.204  The artificial constraints begin with JP 3-61 stating that 
PA personnel will not be involved in PSYOP activities and PSYOP personnel cannot talk 
to media unless it is concerning a PSYOP program.  Additionally, in Malaya, PSYOP 
messages were disseminated using radio, newspapers, and leaflets.  However, US 
doctrine prohibits contact with traditional media (newspaper, radio etc) by PSYOP 
personnel.205  An interesting note is that Hugh Carleton-Greene published an article in 
the New York Times on May 4, 1952 titled In Malaya the Front is Everywhere.206  The 
article states that he is the former head of the Information services, when at the time of 
the article; he was the chief of the PSYWAR division.  If Malaya had been a US 
operation and Carleton-Greene a US citizen, he would not have had access to any press.  
Under current US doctrine, Carleton-Greene would not have press access, as he was a 
member of the PSYWAR division and a practicing expert on PSYOPS.   
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Another artificial constraint is the decision process that removes authority for 
PSYOP and concentrates it in Washington DC (See Section E below) further 
complicating the situation.  A second key point is that British media access focuses upon 
supporting the commander; yet JP 3-53 specifically states that the primary purpose is to 
“expedite the flow of accurate and timely information about the activities of US joint 
forces to the public and internal audience.”207  Unfortunately, these distinctions place an 
artificial constraint upon US operations in developing and disseminating a message in a 
synchronized manner. A recent example of this was the uproar after the US placed 
positive news articles in the Iraqi press.  American media claimed that this was an 
example of the US compromising free press in Iraq.   
The involvement of local personnel was critical in the eventual success of the 
Malayan Emergency.  Local involvement ranged from designing programs and leaflets to 
garnering political support for the embattled administration.  This is particularly 
problematic in terms of PSYOP, which relies upon US planners designing and creating 
appropriate messages.  Unlike the British, US methodologies are somewhat more limited.  
Recent articles in the Washington Post, NY Times and on CNN reported on the 
Department of Defense’s unwillingness to use local personnel due to security clearance 
issues.208  This is in direct contradiction to the methodologies employed by the British in 
Malaya. 
The final concern for US PA is found in its ability to convey selected themes.  
Under current US doctrine, that ability is traditionally found in Public Diplomacy and 
PSYOP, which are limited to foreign audiences.209  Much of the authority to convey 
these messages rests within the State Department and not the Department of Defense.210   
However, this also reveals a dichotomy that is addressed in JP 3-61.  First, PA is separate 
from and should only coordinate messages with PSYOP and MILDEC according to JP 3-
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61.211  JP 3-61 also establishes clear boundaries between PA and PSYOP that did not 
exist in Malaya.  This approach differs significantly from the role British PA played in 
Malaya, where PA did not propagandize, but did provide information on current 
programs. 
 
D. DECENTRALIZED PLANNING 
Decentralized planning was a key innovation in being able to counter the MCP 
within Malaya.  Initially the British government outside Malaya coordinated all actions 
through the High Commissioner.  Authority flowed from the high commissioner through 
civil, military and police sections (for example).  However, the appointment of Sir Harold 
Briggs marked a significant change in how this structure worked and, in turn, a new 
beginning for the counter-insurgency effort.  In a newly created position directly below 
the High Commissioner, Briggs became responsible for all functions.  At the same time, 
he began to establish state and district war committees to coordinate efforts below the 
federal level.  These two changes resulted in the ability to integrate the counterinsurgency 
horizontally across all government functions.  At the same time, these functions allowed 
vertical coordination to happen quickly from the federal thru the local district level.  The 
British decision to create a single position for coordination and the second decision to 
decentralize will be used to examine American Policy, basic organization and the PSYOP 
coordination process.     
To begin with, American policy does not adequately capture the lesson of a single 
person responsible for civil and military integration.  Today, a state department official 
can be responsible for civil and military matters.  However, when a Joint Force 
Commander (JFC) is responsible, this same relation does not exist.  In fact, JP 3-08 
which rightly advocates the use of different executive branches like state, treasury, etc in 
the performance of the job also states that the military “must build consensus212” and 
further states “that the goals of an institution may conflict with the private, usually short-
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term, agendas of its members”213.  It then goes on to state that “the key to success in 
interagency cooperation is to achieve consensus in the Department of Defense before 
entering the interagency process.”214  Again, the Malayan Emergency was managed from 
within theater, not from a London.  The US process does not reflect this lesson.  .     
In essence, American policy creates unnecessary delays in time.  During the 
Malayan Emergency, the civil, military and police chiefs could appeal Briggs’ decisions 
directly to the high commissioner. This appeal process resulted in lost time. However, 
Templar learning from Briggs, eliminated this process prior to accepting the position of 
high commissioner.  In comparison, current American policy creates the problem of 
having another staff build consensus outside the theater of operations without a senior 
decision maker.  There are two problems with consensus seeking, analysis and time.  The 
first problem in most group dynamics is that decisions can be over analyzed or diluted. 
Theoretically, the theater experts are not located in Washington D.C., home of the 
interagency process, but rather in theater.  This does not discount some experts that work 
in various agencies, but the majority of such experts with contemporary knowledge reside 
in-theater.  The second major problem is time.  Building consensus takes time that a JFC 
might not have to spare.  By transferring the decision to another combination of staffs, 
the only guarantee is that the process of consensus wastes valuable time.  In many 
respects, this negates the advantage of the country teams that are supposed to serve that 
function.  The official role of the country team “is to facilitate interagency 
coordination,”215 provide area specific expertise and representatives from all US 
government agencies.  This does not include decision authority that allows the 
representatives to speak for their respective agencies.216 This policy centralizes the 
process and delays decisions made for the theater. 
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Figure 5.   Model for Coordination Between Military and Nonmilitary Organizations 
– Foreign Operations (Taken from JP 3-8 V1, p. III-7) 
 
The second major problem is that of organization.  The British were able to 
combine all civil and military functions under a single senior administrator.  The US does 
not possess a similar ability.  Current doctrine cannot provide an answer for this problem.  
The actual problem is external to the DOD.  JP 3-08 VI states 
The concept of a designated lead agency has not carried with it the 
operational authority to enjoin cooperation.  So, then, how will 
interagency efforts be drawn together to achieve synergism?  Exacerbating 
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the problems surrounding issues of authority and resourcing is the lack of 
an agreed interagency planning process that might synchronize 
interagency effort.  The executive and legislative branches have not 
routinely provided interagency leadership with direct control over the 
resources necessary for interagency operations.217 
The above quote and Figure 5 highlight a major lesson from Malaya not 
incorporated into our current doctrine.  A key point of Figure 5 is that military and 
civilian departments maintain separate chains of command that do not merge until they 
reach the president.  It also highlights the lack of a senior decision maker below the 
President.  Briggs’ reorganization was a means to alleviate this specific problem.  
Unfortunately, this problem is larger than the US military and must be resolved external 
to it.  In the meantime, this organizational design compromises the ability to push 
decisions down to theater level.  This design also compromises the ability to provide a 
timely response.  Briggs was able to decentralize planning, and American policy does not 
capture the first step in that process, that of a single decision maker in theater. 
The final example concerns the development of PSYOP themes and messages.  
By 1952, four years into the emergency, PSYWAR officers at the district and settlement 
level had five themes available for execution.  So long as the settlement PSYWAR 
officers stayed within the approved PSYWAR template, federal approval was not 
required prior to production and dissemination.218   This allowed quick implementation 
of messages against the MCP insurgents.  One of the templates was for the loss of MCP 
insurgents to combat or simply surrendering to the British authorities.219  This leaflet let 
the local settlement committee place an insurgent’s name and photo into a leaflet and get 
it into dissemination by the end of the day, greatly increasing the effect the information 
would have on the MCP insurgents.  This framework also allowed the rapid 
implementation of messages and themes at both the two highest levels, federal and state, 
without interfering with the local campaign. 
This contrasts with US doctrine on Information Operations, where each document 
has a section dedicated to command and control.  As John Nagl points out, “central 
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management is the preferred choice of the US armed service.”220 The new JP 3-07.1 has 
added a section, which calls for working with the local authorities and representatives, 
but does not provide the same degree of leeway that the British used to achieve success in 
Malaya.  While the document actually mentions local sixty-two times, it still requires 
most actions to be coordinated for approval through the senior staff and provides very 
little guidance for simplifying the chain of command.  The result is that while the 
document recommends tailoring the mission to meet local needs, central management of 
all coordination is mandatory.  US doctrinal guidance does not capture this lesson from 
Malaya. 
 
Figure 6.   Psychological Operations Plan and Program Approval Authorities (From 
JP 3-53 p. V-2) 
 
Unfortunately, the DOD places tighter controls on the development of PSYOP 
messages than it does on kinetic capabilities in theater.  Figure six shows that the 
Secretary of Defense must approve objectives and themes.  In fact, JP 3-53 specifically 
states, “The Secretary of Defense normally delegates PSYOP product approval to the 
supported combatant commander. This does not mean that the supported combatant 
commander also has been delegated approval for PSYOP product dissemination.”221  
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This is an important distinction, which means that Joint Force Commander cannot 
distribute leaflets in his/her theater of operations.  In fact, based on this doctrine, the 
highly successful British campaign would never have worked, as only the Joint Force 
Commander can approve products (when delegated).222   However, the joint force 
commander cannot approve themes, objectives, or dissemination of the product in his 
own theater.223 This becomes particularly troublesome as the ability to decide what will 
work in theater becomes resident not with the staff working in theater, but rather in the 
Secretary of Defense’s staff in Washington, D.C.  Contrasting this with process applied in 
Malaya, theater staff made all PSYOP decisions with downward delegation to locales for 
material production and dissemination.  The American policy of centralizing guidance 
also increases the time necessary to create, produce and disseminate a PSYOP message.  
This is in direct contrast to principle six of the PSYOP methodology, which states that 
timeliness is critical.224  In fact, the current system guarantees that production and 
dissemination will take several days, as the only two people with any ability to approve 
any stage of the process are the Joint force commander or the Secretary of Defense in 
Washington.  Official guidance also prevents any creation of a similar system where local 
level officers can create and disseminate tailored PSYOP products for their locality. 
 
E. TECHNOLOGY 
Technology is an advantage that the American military deploys in support of its 
operations.  One of the key lessons of the Malayan Emergency was that technology 
advantages were almost superfluous.  In almost every category, the British and 
government of Malaya had technological superiority over the insurgents. In fact, the 
MCP’s dependence upon a courier system rendered Britain’s sophisticated COMINT 
technology not relevant.225  At the same time, the jungle limited access to both aircraft 
and vehicles.  Used for strategic, operational and tactical mobility, aircraft and motor 
vehicles could not achieve their designed impact.  Instead, Britain relied on patrols, 
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which essentially negated advanced technologies in a leveling effect between the 
insurgents and British forces.  The key lesson here is that technology is only a means, and 
it might or might not work dependent upon the specific opponent in question.  As 
Chalmers-Johnson stated “intimate friendly relations with the civilian population allow 
guerillas to obtain near perfect intelligence concerning military strength and 
movements”226.  Technology cannot counter informal social networks. Unfortunately, as 
John Nagl points out, a “basic tenet of American military doctrine is the concept of 
massive firepower/technology”227. 
Current doctrine places a heavy emphasis on technology.  Placed in context, 
Malayan lessons would indicate a connection between the lack of British success in using 
advanced technology and insurgency.  Lessons from Iraq and Afghanistan are showing 
that insurgents are able to adapt commercially available technology to their needs.  Much 
of the commercial technology being adapted in modern conflicts was not available in 
1948-1960.  Still, US technological advantage is neutralized against the threat in Iraq and 
Afghanistan.  In fact, advanced firepower has negative impact on the population due to its 
inherent lethality. 
Modern US doctrine emphasizes technology and adaptation to current 
circumstances.  JP 3-51 on Electronic Warfare discusses the need to find adversary use of 
the electronic spectrum while securing friendly spectrum use of it.228  Broad in overall 
concept, JP 3-51 offers basic guidance but is lacking in identifying specific needs for 
counter-insurgency.  In Iraq today, computers, key chains, garage door openers and cell 
phones represent several examples of non-traditional technologies being adapted for 
insurgent uses. Yet there is no JP that provides any direction on how to counter the 
integration of technology in a counter-insurgency.  JP 3-51 needs to identify 
requirements, such as education, training, culture and decentralization, which will result 
in an ability to innovate faster than the insurgents.  Considerations of how technology is 
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used in insurgencies versus conventional conflict do not exist at the joint level.  Worse, 
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IV. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION 
A. INSURGENCY DOCTRINE 
First, our doctrine must recognize insurgency as a combat operation.  The 
problem with insurgency is that our current doctrine ignores the lessons learned from 
Malaya and now Iraq.  The DOD is currently drafting a new document for insurgency.  
This document should not be part of the JP 3-07 series on major operations other than 
war, as it is a form of war.  The document should be a stand-alone document that 
designates a single service as the lead for the insurgency mission.  The US Air Force and 
Navy have a role but are not appropriate for developing counter-insurgency doctrine.  
The Army, according to John Nagl, has systematically dismissed insurgency when not 
engaged in an active insurgent conflict.  As the United States Marine Corps has shown 
interest in counter-insurgency, one recommendation would be to designate the USMC as 
the lead service in the counter-insurgency mission.  This would include making the 
USMC the service lead for organizing and equipping forces for insurgencies.  
 
B. MESSAGE 
This message problem is partially within the scope of DOD doctrine to change.  A 
well-crafted plan would remove most of the artificial constraints.  Current US law 
prohibits the use of PSYOP messages upon the American populace.  However, the 
concept of using traditional media to convey either PSYOP or deception messages would 
create a firestorm within the US media community.  This is in spite of the fact that the 
deception for D-Day made extensive use of conventional media like radio and 
newspapers for distribution of both deception and PSYOP messages.  The D-Day 
methodology used the media as unwitting participants, in that they reported what they are 
given.  The issue centers around whether PA will pass information to the media that is 
misleading.  JP 3-61 makes it impossible, given current language, for PA to be an 
unwitting participant to achieve COIN objectives.    Unfortunately, JP 3-61 seems to 
imply that some type of agreement needs to be in place with civilian media before 
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removing any artificial constraints.  This becomes important as modern communications 
technology continues reduce the traditional difference between theater and domestic 
audiences.  Without resolution to the question of access to foreign media for 
counterinsurgency messages, American PSYOP will remain effectively shackled and 
incapable of creating the effects Britain did in Malaya. 
 
C.  DECENTRALIZED PLANNING 
In terms of decentralized planning, and specifically in terms of PSYOP, this paper 
recommends that the theater commander have the ability both to develop themes in 
advance, for approval, and to disseminate these themes through the appropriate mediums 
in theater.  This authority would also include the ability to push pre-approved themes and 
products to lower levels for faster implementation than our current models.   
Similarly, the purpose of a country team, when working with the US ambassador, 
is to provide contact with and decision-making authority in country to respond to the 
crisis du jour.  Peace and conflict, not war, are the situations where country teams 
normally exist.  Based upon the Malayan Emergency, the US military needs that similar 
capabilities and authorities for counter-insurgency. However, if a country team is in place 
when the US declares war or places a JFC in charge, those teams lose their decision 
authority.  Decision authority reverts to Washington versus theater.  Instead, this paper 
recommends that a country team provide the same capabilities to the Joint Force 
Commander or an Ambassador.  Appropriate policy decisions would remain in 
Washington, but execution should remain under the direction of either the JFC or 
ambassador, supported by appropriate staffs.    A common country team would also 
simplify transition to a more peaceful situation managed by an ambassador.  It would 
eliminate many duplicative staff actions attempting to achieve consensus on issues on the 
opposite sides of the world and accelerate the decision process. 
 
D. TECHNOLOGY 
There are two lessons to take from Malaya in terms of technology.  First, that 
technological superiority does not confer an automatic advantage.  Second, that Malaya is 
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not a good case to examine insurgent use of technology.  US doctrine, particularly, JP 3-
51 on EW needs to identify the requirements needed to anticipate technological 




When I began writing this thesis, the purpose was to see if American military 
forces have incorporated those lessons learned by the British Government and the 
Government of Malaya during the Malayan Emergency into our doctrinal guidance.  At 
most, the American armed forces have learned the lessons that they wanted to learn.  
Critical terms like insurgency and downward delegation are in the doctrine, but the 
organizations retain a highly centralized management style, which diametrically opposes 
the lessons of Malaya.  While Insurgency is not a distinct form of war according to US 
doctrine, the same doctrine shows that it does not involve combat.  The evening news 
from Iraq (or in the past, Vietnam) highlights the inadequacy of our current definition for 
insurgency. 
Critical capabilities like Public Affairs and PSYOP are shackled by bureaucratic 
restraint and artificial limitations.  In the battle of minds, the US has organized to fail by 
limiting its ability to integrate civilian and military capabilities effectively.  Currently, PA 
and PSYOP organizations are designed for major force on force conflict, not 
counterinsurgency.  Organizational limitations hamper US efforts in winning any conflict 
that sheer force of arms cannot handle.  At a minimum, looking to Washington DC for 
every PSYOP and PA decision will so increase our decision cycle timeline as to make it 
completely ineffective, regardless of the decision rendered.  Furthermore, the knowledge 
necessary for effective and efficient decisions is located in theater. 
Finally, this has been an enlightening study in terms that, as an officer, one should 
truly understand the positive and negative aspects of his/her guidance.  In the case of 
insurgency, the guidance is so inadequate as to be of questionable use in most situations.  
The fact that doctrine defines insurgency as a non-combat operation shows how little 
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experience our guidance actually captures.  This should be doubly frightening given the 
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